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A NEW MODEL FOR OVERSIGHT OF 
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES BY NONPROFITS? 
Jannon Stein* 
 
This Note discusses a New Jersey tax case, Fields v. Trustees of Princeton 
University, that settled in 2016 after motion practice.  The plaintiffs were 
twenty-eight municipal taxpayers in Princeton who challenged Princeton 
University’s entire property-tax exemption on the ground that the way the 
University distributed royalty payments from patents to faculty inventors and 
licensed these patents in joint ventures and other partnerships ran afoul of 
the “profit test” that applies to educational property-tax exemptions in New 
Jersey.  This Note uses this litigation to discuss a potential conflict between 
the Bayh-Dole Act, which encourages academic patent development, and 
such profit tests on charitable and educational property exemptions in 
several states.  It concludes that while the model of litigation in Fields could 
offer a new procedural oversight means over nonprofits, a better solution 
involves substantive legislative reform that regularizes current ad hoc 
payments between municipalities and large nonprofits and better aligns local 
property taxes with federal policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From 2011 to 2016, a curious case wound itself through the New Jersey 
Tax Court.1  In 2011, a small group of Princeton residents sued Princeton 
University (the “University”) and the municipality where it is located, then 
known as the Borough of Princeton,2 challenging the tax-exempt status of 
 
 1. See Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., No. 7672-2016 (N.J. Tax Ct. Apr. 13, 2016); 
Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 28 N.J. Tax 574, 578 (2015) (discussing the progress from 
an initial filing to a denied interlocutory appeal); see also Complaint at 1, Estate of Lewis v. 
Trs. of Princeton Univ., No. 010656-2011 (N.J. Tax Ct. July 8, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 
Complaint].  This Note refers to these related actions as Fields. 
 2. The former Borough and Township of Princeton merged in 2013, partly to reduce tax 
bills through efficiency. See Jon Offredo, Princeton Consolidation Pays Off:  $61M Budget 
2018] NONPROFIT COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY 2031 
twenty-one properties that the University owns.3  In 2014 and 2015, four of 
the plaintiffs filed a related suit, Fields v. Trustees of Princeton University,4 
to challenge all of the University’s property-tax exemptions in Princeton.5  
When the case settled in October 2016, it encompassed twenty-eight 
plaintiffs challenging Princeton University’s property-tax exemption in toto.6  
The plaintiffs had argued that the University’s collection and distribution of 
patent revenues was too oriented around private profit to be exempt.7 
This Note argues that this litigation demonstrates a new but fraught means 
of oversight over nonprofit organizations.  It also uses Fields to reveal 
tensions between state and federal laws over the proper borders of the 
revenue-generating activities of nonprofits and points to potential reforms to 
resolve those tensions. 
Part I presents the doctrinal background on how tax law regulates the 
boundaries of the revenue-generating activities of nonprofits.  It demonstrates 
the differences between the federal exemption and state-level property-tax 
exemptions before discussing how the Bayh-Dole Act’s incentivizing of 
patent development by nonprofit institutions is situated in this framework. 
Part II discusses the substantive tension between state laws with profit tests 
for property-tax exemptions and the Bayh-Dole Act, which encourages 
nonprofits to develop and commercialize patents.  It concludes that the 
discrepancies between the Bayh-Dole Act and profit tests for state property-
tax exemptions do not result in a direct legal conflict between federal and 
state laws. 
This Note explains why the tension results in neither preemption nor 
serious concerns from dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.  Yet, this Note 
presents pragmatic policy arguments for why the federal and state-level laws 
should be brought into closer alignment or delineated from each other with 
greater clarity.  This Note then contrasts the litigation enforcement model 
used in Fields against recent and proposed legislative reforms in several 
states.  It analyzes how the legal doctrine that allows municipal taxpayer suits 
could reshape the oversight of nonprofit organizations if Fields is taken up 
 
Comes with Tax Rate Decrease, NJ.COM (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.nj.com/mercer/index.ssf/ 
2013/04/princeton_consolidation_pays_o.html [https://perma.cc/DBD3-3Q8C].  But see 
Krystal Knapp, Christie Perpetuates Myth That Consolidation Reduced Princeton Budget by 
$3 Million, PLANET PRINCETON (Jan. 15, 2014), http://planetprinceton.com/2014/01/15/ 
christie-perpetuates-myth-consolidation-reduced-princeton-budget-3-million/ 
[https://perma.cc/F3P8-PB7B] (disputing the reduction). 
 3. New Jersey law allows partial taxation of properties. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 
(West 2017) (providing “that if any portion of such buildings are leased to profit-making 
organizations or otherwise used for purposes which are not themselves exempt from taxation, 
said portion shall be subject to taxation and the remaining portion only shall be exempt”); see 
also infra Part I.B.2.  The initial suit challenged particular buildings along these grounds. See 
Complaint, supra note 1, at 2–6; W. Raymond Ollwerther, Challenge over Taxes, PRINCETON 
ALUMNI WKLY. (Sept. 18, 2013), https://paw.princeton.edu/article/challenge-over-taxes 
[https://perma.cc/4ULH-49V9]. 
 4. 28 N.J. Tax 574 (2015). 
 5. See id. at 578. 
 6. See Complaint at 2, Fields, No. 7672-2016 [hereinafter 2016 Complaint]; Fields, 28 
N.J. Tax at 578 (discussing the progress from filing to a denied interlocutory appeal). 
 7. See 2016 Complaint, supra note 6, at 12. 
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as a litigation model by other plaintiffs, as well as how different reform 
statutes balance interests and concerns at stake in exemption policy. 
Part III argues that while municipal taxpayer suits may represent a new 
enforcement model for policing the borders of revenue generating and 
distributing activities in the nonprofit sector, substantive legislative reform 
would be preferable.  It warns that local oversight through third-party 
challenges cannot resolve the disconnect between local and federal laws.  
Therefore, it concludes that substantive legislative reform provides a better 
opportunity to address the concerns raised in Fields.  This Part then examines 
legislative models proposed or adopted in New Jersey, Connecticut, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, and California. 
Finally, Part IV advocates for reform modeled primarily after the 
California legislation, which takes a nuanced approach to the linkages 
between entity-level income, property use, and ad valorem taxation. 
I.  THE REGULATION OF NONPROFITS THROUGH TAX LAW 
Part I introduces the issue of oversight of nonprofit business activities at 
the federal and state levels.  Part I.A sketches the broad contours of the 
federal framework and presents the doctrinal context for how federal income 
tax regulates the ways nonprofit corporations may generate revenue and what 
they may do with it.  Part I.A.1 explains that nonprofits can have positive 
revenue, while Part I.A.2 clarifies that charitable organizations must provide 
primarily public rather than private benefits.  Part I.A.3 explains that 
nonprofits are subject to what scholars call the “nondistribution constraint.”8 
Part I.B clarifies that federal tax law and property-tax exemptions for 
charitable organizations exist independently.  Part I.B.1 explains New Jersey 
law and uses it to illustrate how frameworks for local property-tax exemption 
can differ significantly from the federal income-tax exemption.  Part I.B.2 
demonstrates that the “profit test” in New Jersey is a more restrictive 
nondistribution constraint than that imposed under the federal framework.  
Part I.B.3 presents how profit tests in several other states work. 
Part I.C discusses how the Bayh-Dole Act functions as well as its history 
and legacy.  It explains that this federal law encourages universities and other 
nonprofits to develop and commercialize patents.  Thus, this law exacerbates 
the discrepancies between the federal- and state-level schemes regulating 
nonprofit revenues. 
A.  Introductory Doctrinal Background 
Nonprofit law is often divided into two broad areas:  (1) state laws 
governing corporate status and (2) federal laws and policies connected to tax-
exempt status under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.9  This latter 
status confers such extensive advantages that it has become a synecdoche for 
 
 8. This term was coined by Henry Hansmann. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 9. See, e.g., JAMES J. FISHMAN, STEPHEN SCHWARZ & LLOYD HITOSHI MAYER, 
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS:  CASES AND MATERIALS, at xiii–xiv (5th ed. 2015); see also I.R.C. 
§ 501(c)(3) (2012). 
2018] NONPROFIT COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY 2033 
the entire sector10 and functions as a “signaling” device11 for a multitude of 
actors who rely on it.  The regulations tied to it are primary oversight tools 
governing the sector.12  Local property-tax exemptions form a third body of 
law affecting nonprofits; their considerations are not fully congruent with 
those that apply to federal tax status.  As this Note focuses on an intersection 
between local property-tax exemptions and federal law, it sketches key 
considerations for federal qualification to provide a contrasting background 
for the legal issues at stake. 
1.  Nonprofits Can Generate Positive Revenue 
Nonprofit organizations include major hospitals, universities, museums, 
and other cultural institutions, some of which generate significant revenue.13  
Scholars of urban economies often stress the importance of having robust 
“meds and eds” sectors within municipalities and regions.14  Although many 
outsiders assume the term “nonprofit” refers to a lack of substantial net 
earnings,15 nonprofits can have significant annual earnings from their own 
activities as well as from investment of very large endowments.16  The 
distinction between nonprofit and for-profit corporations is not based on a 
lack of substantial revenue; rather, the distinction lies in the purposes of the 
organization, who may control it and how, and how revenues are spent. 
 
 10. See Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations:  A 
Two-Edged Sword?, in NONPROFITS AND GOVERNMENT:  COLLABORATION AND CONFLICT 133, 
134 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 3d ed. 2017). 
 11. Susannah Camic Tahk, Crossing the Tax Code’s For-Profit/Nonprofit Border, 118 
PENN ST. L. REV. 489, 491 (2014). 
 12. See, e.g., Brody & Cordes, supra note 10, at 142 (noting the role of the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) in policing the “nonprofit-government border and the nonprofit-
commercial border” as well as payments to insiders). 
 13. See Elise Young, Princeton’s Neighbors Say to Heck with Freebies—We Want Cash, 
BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-02/princeton-
s-neighbors-say-to-heck-with-freebies-we-want-cash [https://perma.cc/2D2S-KWRH] 
(estimating Princeton University’s endowment at $22.7 billion). 
 14. See, e.g., Carolyn Adams, The Meds and Eds in Urban Economic Development, 25 J. 
URB. AFF. 571, 572 (2003); Adam John Parrillo & Mark de Socio, Universities and Hospitals 
as Agents of Economic Stability and Growth in Small Cities:  A Comparative Analysis, 11 
INDUS. GEOGRAPHER 1, 2 (2014). 
 15. See, e.g., Jeanne Bell, Nonprofit Budgets Have to Balance:  False!, BLUE AVOCADO, 
http://www.blueavocado.org/content/nonprofit-budgets-have-balance-false 
[https://perma.cc/J4BU-U7DC] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018); Myths About Nonprofits, NAT’L 
COUNCIL NONPROFITS, https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/myths-about-nonprofits 
[https://perma.cc/BM5T-TV46] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 16. At least one hundred nonprofits in New York State reported revenues over $10 million 
in their most recent 990 filings, and many report assets worth hundreds of millions of dollars. 
See Search Active Organizations, NAT’L CTR. CHARITABLE STAT., http://www.nccs. 
urban.org/sites/all/nccs-archive/html/PubApps/search.php [https://perma.cc/Q9GQ-PJTA] 
(search with “Location—State” as “New York” and “Revenue Size” as “$10 million or more”) 
(last visited Feb. 14, 2018).  See generally Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit 
Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980). 
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2.  Nonprofits Must Exist for Public Benefit 
Not-for-profit corporation laws and federal tax-exemption laws require 
that such organizations pursue either specifically protected purposes or more 
generally defined charitable purposes that provide public benefits.17  Various 
state and federal provisions incorporate these requirements.18  These 
legislative schemes put a premium on education.19  Still, all qualifying 
organizations must show that their activities serve a primary purpose 
designed to create public benefits.20 
Broadly, when the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or a court determines 
that an organization’s other commercial activities are de minimis, revenues 
from those activities are subject to federal unrelated business income tax 
(UBIT).21  Otherwise, the organization may lose its exempt status.22  While 
one scholar describes this as a system of rigid borders between nonprofit and 
for-profit enterprises,23 others see these borders as murky.24  Sporadic 
enforcement in this area contributes to a lack of clarity.25  This Note does not 
delve deeply into this federal doctrine but rather examines how similar 
activities are treated in the local property-taxation context where they are 
perhaps even more politically controversial.26 
 
 17. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(ii) (2017) (requiring “a public rather than a private 
interest”). 
 18. See id.; see also N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 102(a)(3-a), (3-b) (McKinney 
2017) (defining “charitable corporation” and “charitable purposes”). 
 19. See Janne Gallagher, The Legal Structure of Property Tax Exemption, in PROPERTY-
TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES 3, 5 (Evelyn Brody ed., 2002) (noting that most states exempt 
educational institutions from property tax); see also I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (2012) (setting 
preferential deductibility for certain entities like churches and schools); I.R.C. § 509(a) 
(defining private foundations as a default category with exceptions related to deductibility of 
donations and public support); VIRGINIA G. RICHARDSON & JOHN FRANCIS REILLY, INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., 2003 EO CPE, PUBLIC CHARITY OR PRIVATE FOUNDATION STATUS:  ISSUES 
UNDER IRC 509(a)(1)-(4), 4942(j)(3), AND 507, at 16–26 (2003), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/eotopicb03.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9JW-8N9Z] (discussing the preferential “public 
charity” status that applies to educational institutions). 
 20. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2017); see also RICHARDSON & REILLY, supra 
note 19, at 16–19, 29–31, 33–34. 
 21. See I.R.C. §§ 511–513; Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (including examples); see also Joseph 
J. Cordes & Burton A. Weisbrod, Differential Taxation of Nonprofits and the 
Commercialization of Nonprofit Revenues, 17 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 195, 197, 201 
(1998); Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity:  A Historical Analysis of America’s 
Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2439, 2472, 2479, 2483–85 (2005).  See 
generally Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line:  Uncovering the History and Political 
Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1475 (2005). 
 22. See, e.g., Airlie Found. v. IRS, 283 F. Supp. 2d 58, 65 (D.D.C. 2003) (revoking a 
conference center’s exemption because of the “‘commercial hue’ to the way Airlie carrie[d] 
out its business”); see also Kelley, supra note 21, at 2474. 
 23. See Tahk, supra note 11, at 491. 
 24. See, e.g., John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 508 (2002) (“Case law sheds virtually no light on the overall 
interface between taxing commercial activity and revoking tax exemption because of it.”); see 
also Kelley, supra note 21, at 2476 (calling this doctrinal terrain “vague and malleable”). 
 25. See Kelley, supra note 21, at 2484–85. 
 26. See Robert T. Grimm, Jr., Targeting the Charitable Property-Tax Exemption to 
Collective Goods, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 321, 321. 
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Finally, all charitable nonprofits, even educational institutions, must 
demonstrate a primary public purpose as well as a lack of inurement or 
substantial private benefit.27  The latter is found when an organization is set 
up to provide an overwhelming amount of benefit to outsiders who are not 
incidental members of a broad class of charitable beneficiaries.28  Inurement, 
on the other hand, is found where key insiders are able to control and extract 
charitable assets.29  Under current federal law, there is a regime of 
intermediate sanctions that allows the IRS to apply excise taxes and penalties 
if excessively beneficial transactions to specific insiders are not unwound.30 
3.  Nonprofits Are Subject to the “Nondistribution Constraint” 
The concepts of private benefit and inurement in federal tax law are part 
of what scholars deem the “nondistribution constraint” governing 
nonprofits.31  This means that nonprofits cannot distribute assets as profits or 
shares and must instead devote them to charitable purposes.32  State 
corporation laws also enforce this principle.  For example, New York’s Not-
for-Profit Corporations Law embodies it in rules on institutional funds,33 the 
sale of substantially all assets,34 and on dissolution.35  Taken together, state-
level not-for-profit corporations laws and federal tax-exemption law create a 
regulatory framework that encourages nonprofits to pursue innovative 
charitable ends for public benefit36 so long as they do not create or distribute 
overly private benefits.37 
B.  Property-Tax Exemptions for Charitable Organizations 
Are Independent of Federal Tax-Exempt Status 
Local property-tax exemptions are independent from federal law.  They 
reside in state constitutions and state-level laws as well as in local adoptions 
 
 27. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2); § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii); see also John D. 
Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1064–66 (2006); Peter G. 
Dagher Jr., Note, Social Impact Bonds and the Private Benefit Doctrine:  Will Participation 
Jeopardize a Nonprofit’s Tax-Exempt Status?, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3479, 3487–98 (2013) 
(providing a doctrinal overview). 
 28. See Colombo, supra note 27, at 1064–65. 
 29. See, e.g., Airlie Found., Inc. v. United States, 826 F. Supp. 537, 551–52 (D.D.C. 1993) 
(revoking exemption where an organization’s director transferred land and wealth to other 
entities he and his family controlled), aff’d, 55 F.3d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
 30. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958.  The law refers to these insiders as 
disqualified persons. See I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1).  See generally Treas. Reg. § 53.4958–3 (2017). 
 31. See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 
497, 501 (1981). 
 32. See id. 
 33. See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§ 550–558 (McKinney 2017). 
 34. See id. §§ 509–511. 
 35. See id. § 1001(d)(3). 
 36. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 609–10 (1983) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (noting the importance of a pluralistic philanthropic sector); Evelyn Brody, Legal 
Theories of Tax Exemption:  A Sovereignty Perspective, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR 
CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 145, 153 (discussing pluralism as a justification for tax 
exemption). 
 37. See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 27, at 1081–86. 
2036 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
and assessments.  All fifty states provide for some charitable exemptions.38  
Many preexist the federal charitable exemption by decades;39 New Jersey’s 
dates to 1851.40  Certain universities, including Yale, Columbia, Harvard, 
and Princeton, can trace a tax-exempt status to a colonial charter that predates 
federal law altogether.41 
Given their longevity, educational and charitable property tax exemption 
statutes do not anticipate the modern “knowledge economy,” in which 
universities and other nonprofits play a driving role.42  Property tax 
exemptions often have tighter restrictions on the generation and use of 
revenues than either the federal exemption or state nonprofit corporation 
laws.  Neither a federal tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) nor even state status 
as a not-for-profit corporation acts as a guarantee of a local property-tax 
exemption.43 
Federal law exempts nonprofits from tax on corporate income, which 
functions both as a subsidy to capital formation44 and as an endowment 
subsidy.45  The property-tax exemption, however, works much more like a 
pure subsidy.46  Because it can significantly reduce an organization’s 
ongoing costs compared to the costs faced by for-profit competitors and local 
neighbors, property-tax exemption can subsidize production factors in 
addition to capital asset formation.47 
Yet for many small nonprofits, especially many religious organizations, 
the property-tax exemption protects the sole major asset of the 
organization—one that is essential to the organization’s ability to fulfill its 
functions.48  Some scholars argue that protecting religious property from tax 
 
 38. See Gallagher, supra note 19, at 4. 
 39. The federal exemptions date to 1894. See Paul Arnsberger et al., A History of the Tax-
Exempt Sector:  An SOI Perspective, STAT. INCOME BULL., Winter 2008, at 105, 106, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/tehistory.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Y6S-GMJD]. 
 40. See AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456, 465 (2015). 
 41. See, e.g., Peter Dobkin Hall, Is Tax Exemption Intrinsic or Contingent?  Tax 
Treatment of Voluntary Associations, Nonprofit Organizations, and Religious Bodies in New 
Haven, Connecticut, 1750-2000, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, 
at 253, 256–58 (detailing the early history of Yale).  These were complex documents; at one 
point, Princeton’s charter restricted it to an annual income equivalent to 20,000 bushels of 
wheat. See ALEXANDER LEITCH, A PRINCETON COMPANION 89–90 (1978). 
 42. See, e.g., infra notes 177–79 and accompanying text (discussing how the Bayh-Dole 
Act spurred this economic shift). 
 43. See, e.g., infra notes 62–67 and accompanying text. 
 44. See Daniel Halperin, Is Income Tax Exemption for Charities a Subsidy?, 64 TAX L. 
REV. 283, 285, 296 (2011). 
 45. Id. at 298–300, 306–08. 
 46. See, e.g., Joseph J. Cordes, Marie Gantz & Thomas Pollak, What Is the Property-Tax 
Exemption Worth?, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 81, 81; 
Dick Netzer, Local Government Finance and the Economics of Property-Tax Exemption, in 
PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 47, 58–60. 
 47. Philadelphia used this argument to justify its Voluntary Contribution Plan in the early 
1990s. See David B. Glancey, PILOTs:  Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, in PROPERTY-TAX 
EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 211, 224; see also Netzer, supra note 46, at 69–
74 (discussing when charging nonprofits for local services makes sense). 
 48. See, e.g., Cordes, Gantz & Pollak, supra note 46, at 85; Stephen Diamond, Efficiency 
and Benevolence:  Philanthropic Tax Exemptions in 19th-Century America, in PROPERTY-TAX 
EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 115, 117; see also Deirdre Dessingue, The 
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liens is at the historical core of all nonprofit law.49  They suggest that the 
separate sovereignty of the church is the root of why nongovernmental 
organizations that create public goods receive tax exemption.50  State laws 
and cases, meanwhile, tend to stress that exemptions are grants by the 
sovereign state and that the burden of demonstrating qualification must be on 
the applicant.51 
From a fiscal point of view, property-tax exemptions tend to provide the 
greatest subsidies to nonprofits that own property in municipalities with high 
property values and high tax assessments,52 although tax-rate competition 
between municipalities plays a role as well.53  Such subsidies may reduce 
incentives for nonprofits to rent office space and other property in areas with 
lower property values that might benefit from investment in the local 
economy.54  Importantly, property taxes are often the largest source of 
municipal revenues,55 making choices about rates and exemptions highly 
controversial.  The recent limitation of the deductibility of state and local 
taxes coupled with the near-doubling of the standard deduction will likely 
exacerbate tensions over local charitable exemptions from property tax as 
both home owners and charities find their budgets tightened as a result of the 
federal tax reform.56 
 
Special Case of Churches, in PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 
173, 173–74, 176–77. 
 49. See Dessingue, supra note 48, at 173; Diamond, supra note 48, at 116–17; see also 
Brody & Cordes, supra note 10, at 141 (citing Genesis 47:26 for a land tax excluding priestly 
property). 
 50. See Dessingue, supra note 48, at 176. 
 51. See Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 28 N.J. Tax 574, 580 (2015) (“Statutes granting 
exemption from taxation represent a departure and consequently they are most strongly 
construed against those claiming exemption.” (quoting Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of 
Princeton, 172 A.2d 420, 422 (N.J. 1961))); see also infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
 52. See, e.g., Charles Brecher & Thad Calabrese, CityLaw:  Three Policy Questions for 
Nonprofit Property Tax Exemptions, CITYLAND (May 5, 2015), http://www.cityland 
nyc.org/citylaw-three-policy-questions-for-nonprofit-property-tax-exemptions/ 
[https://perma.cc/6FAN-WVCN] (providing New York City estimates).  But see Joan M. 
Youngman, The Politics of the Property-Tax Debate:  Political Issues, in PROPERTY-TAX 
EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 23, 27–29 (noting valuation difficulties).  
Furthermore, problems with using property taxes as a proxy for taxing wealth have been noted 
by scholars for decades. See, e.g., Comment, Judicial Restoration of the General Property Tax 
Base, 44 YALE L.J. 1075, 1075 n.1 (1935). 
 53. See, e.g., Peter M. Mieszkowski & George R. Zodrow, Taxation and the Tiebout 
Model:  The Differential Effects of Head Taxes, Taxes on Land Rents, and Property Taxes, 27 
J. ECON. LITERATURE 1098, 1099–1100 (1989) (discussing competition in tax rates and 
services). 
 54. This is because most states only exempt properties owned by nonprofits, not those 
rented by nonprofits. See Gallagher, supra note 19, at 6–9.  But see Cordes, Gantz & Pollak, 
supra note 46, at 99–106 (arguing that decisions to own or to lease property also depend on 
the deductibility of depreciation). 
 55. See, e.g., DIV. OF LOCAL GOV’T & SCH. ACCOUNTABILITY, OFFICE OF THE N.Y. STATE 
COMPTROLLER, PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS IN NEW YORK STATE 1 (2013), https://www.osc. 
state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/propertytax_exemptions.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZF9-
NE9Y] (noting that they are the largest source of revenue for New York State municipalities). 
 56. See, e.g., Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1:  Nonprofit Analysis of the Final Tax Bill 
Proposal, NAT’L COUNCIL NONPROFITS (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.councilofnonprofits.org/ 
sites/default/files/documents/tax-bill-summary-chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/WBL4-D7DT]. 
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Because local property taxes support very local benefits like police, fire, 
sewage, road maintenance, and school services, some states and 
municipalities request that large nonprofits pay annual payments in lieu of 
taxes (PILOT) to partially compensate local governments for such services.57  
Over the past few decades, such PILOTs have become a regular part of the 
budgets of the largest nonprofits, especially colleges and universities.58  
Princeton University’s PILOT to the municipality and the neighboring West 
Windsor Township is the tenth-highest in the nation.59 
In many states, property-tax exemptions have a two-prong test:  
(1) whether the property is owned by a favored legal entity (e.g., a nonprofit, 
educational institution, or church) and (2) whether it is held for a favored use 
(e.g., charitable, public, educational, or religious).60  Other states, however, 
including New Jersey, apply additional prongs or requirements, including 
“profit tests.”61 
Yet, even in states without a separate profit test, fears of private benefit 
shape how courts interpret claims of exemption.  A New York case from 
2015, Greater Jamaica Development Corp. v. New York City Tax 
Commission,62 illustrates how a two-prong test works.  There, the court 
denied an exemption for parking lots via the use prong.63  Although a 
community development corporation with § 501(c)(3) status owned the lots 
and made a credible argument that they advanced its federally exempt 
purposes,64 these purposes did not fit the use categories of New York’s Real 
Property Tax Lax section 420-a.65  The court also concluded that the lots 
provided private benefit that “inure[d]” to local businesses,66 even though 
under federal law, inurement is understood to be benefit to key insiders that 
control the organization rather than private benefit per se.67 
Ocean Pines Ass’n, Inc. v. Commissioner68 shows the different approach 
federal law takes.  There, a nonprofit homeowners’ association owned beach 
parking lots and a clubhouse accessible only to its members.69  The court 
construed parking-lot income to be derived from activities creating private 
benefits rather than ones advancing the organization’s social welfare 
 
 57. See generally Adam H. Langley, Daphne A. Kenyon & Patricia C. Bailin, Payments 
in Lieu of Taxes by Nonprofits:  Which Nonprofits Make PILOTs and Which Localities Receive 
Them (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Working Paper No. WP12AL1, 2012), 
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/langley-wp12al1-full_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6LHD-9JFW]. 
 58. Id. at 3. 
 59. Id. at 6. 
 60. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420-a(1)(a) (McKinney 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 105-278.3 (2017). 
 61. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 62. 36 N.E.3d 645 (N.Y. 2015). 
 63. Id. at 652–53. 
 64. Id. at 651–52. 
 65. Id. at 652–53; see also N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 420-a. 
 66. Greater Jamaica Dev. Corp., 26 N.E.3d at 653. 
 67. See Colombo, supra note 27, at 1067–73; Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to 
Insiders and Outsiders:  Is the Sky the Limit?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 744–45 (2007). 
 68. 672 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 69. Id. at 289. 
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mission.70  It concluded that the association had to pay UBIT;71 the overall 
exemption was preserved.72 
In some ways, the outcomes of these cases were quite similar.  In each, a 
nonprofit had to pay taxes on its parking lots.  In the federal case, an 
organization had to pay UBIT on parking-lot income, while in the New York 
case, one had to pay property taxes on its parking lots.  Yet one involved a 
partial tax, while the other denied exemption for a particular parcel of real 
property.  Additionally, the cases demonstrate that a property used to 
generally advance a charitable purpose may not qualify under the specific 
“actual use” standards for charitable property-tax exemptions that exist in 
every state.73  Property-tax exemptions are thus not available on a general 
basis to nonprofits.  In states that apply a further profit test, even tighter limits 
may constrict nonprofit activities. 
1.  Profit Tests Differ Significantly from Federal Exemption Law 
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated its exemption doctrine as a three-
part test in Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millburn Township74:  “(1) [the 
corporation] must be organized exclusively for the [purposes of the 
exemption category]; (2) its property must be actually and exclusively used 
for the tax-exempt purpose; and (3) its operation and use of its property must 
not be conducted for profit.”75  Although statutory changes rendered the 
exclusive-use question moot in 198576 and similar limits on schools had 
already been removed in 1913,77 New Jersey courts still apply the rest of test.  
Its “prongs [are] respectively referred to as (1) the ‘organization test,’ (2) the 
‘use test,’ and (3) the ‘profit test.’”78 
This framework for property tax exemption is not a mirror of the tests for 
federal income tax exemption under § 501(c)(3).  Yet the tests seem 
comparable at first glance.  The “organization test” under New Jersey law 
closely resembles the “organized test” under federal law,79 in that it focuses 
on whether charters, bylaws, and other documents show an exclusively 
 
 70. Id. at 289–92. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. at 287–89, 292. 
 73. See Gallagher, supra note 19, at 9.  But see N.Y. REAL PROP. TAX LAW § 494-a 
(McKinney 2017) (allowing exemptions to be granted retroactively to the date of deed in New 
York City); Not-For-Profit (NFP) Organization Property Tax Exemptions/Reductions, N.Y.C. 
DEP’T FIN., http://www1.nyc.gov/site/finance/benefits/benefits-not-for-profit-
organizations.page [https://perma.cc/XW65-DEQA] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018) (documenting 
New York City’s related policy of allowing a contemplated use exemption). 
 74. 472 A.2d 517 (N.J. 1984). 
 75. Id. at 518. 
 76. See Int’l Sch. Servs., Inc. v. West Windsor Township, 21 A.3d 1166, 1174 (N.J. 2011). 
 77. See Pingry Corp. v. Hillside Township., 217 A.2d 868, 870–71 (N.J. 1966) (noting 
that exclusive use language for schools was added in 1903 and removed in 1913); see also 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 2017). 
 78. Borough of Hamburg v. Trs. of Presbytery of Newton, 28 N.J. Tax 311, 318 (2015) 
(exempting buildings used to store church documents because the use was “reasonably 
necessary”). 
 79. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (2017). 
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exempt purpose.80  This purpose, however, must be enumerated in the 
property-tax exemption statute.  Neither status as a not-for-profit corporation 
under New Jersey law81 nor being organized for purposes exempt under 
§ 501(c)(3) is sufficient.82 
The New Jersey statute is complex and contains targeted language for 
specific types of exemption, but all categories are subject to the limitation 
that “in case of all the foregoing, the buildings, or the lands on which they 
stand, or the associations, corporations or institutions using and occupying 
them as aforesaid, are not conducted for profit . . . .”83  The New Jersey Tax 
Court has stressed that the “profit test” is a “pragmatic inquiry”84 with a 
limited de minimis exception that will not protect a property where 
substantial nonexempt activity occurs.85  Although de minimis profits and 
commercial activities can be permissible,86 New Jersey does not consider an 
organization’s exempt status under § 501(c)(3) controlling for property tax 
disputes.87  The application form indicates that “a for-profit motive, as 
evidenced by the facts, invalidates exemption, i.e., is the organization’s 
structure, financial agreements, tuitions, fees set etc. with the intent to make 
a profit.”88 
 
 80. See, e.g., Black United Fund of N.J., Inc. v. City of East Orange, 17 N.J. Tax 446, 455 
(1998), aff’d, 772 A.2d 65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (“[The organization’s] certificate 
of incorporation provides that its purpose is to [distribute funds] . . . to other federally tax-
exempt organizations . . . .  The organization’s bylaws provide for the same . . . .  These 
purposes . . . are not identified as exempt purposes in N.J.S.A. 54:4-3.6.”). 
 81. Id. at 449. 
 82. Id. 
 83. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 2017) (emphases added).  For properties exempt on 
“charitable, benevolent, or religious” grounds, the statute continues: 
the exemption . . . shall extend . . . where the [exempt] work therein carried on is 
supported partly by fees and charges received from or on behalf of beneficiaries 
using or occupying the buildings; provided the building is wholly controlled by and 
the entire income therefrom is used for said charitable, benevolent or religious 
purposes . . . . 
Id. (emphases added). 
 84. AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456, 496 (2015) (applying a 
requirement for a “pragmatic inquiry into profitability. . . . [where] mechanical centering on 
income and expense figures is to be avoided” (quoting Paper Mill Playhouse v. Millburn 
Township, 472 A.2d 517, 526 (N.J. 1984)). 
 85. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Borough of Princeton, 172 A.2d 420, 424 (N.J. 1961) 
(denying exemption as press works regularly served outside businesses); Phillipsburg 
Riverview Org. v. Town of Phillipsburg, 27 N.J. Tax 188, 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) 
(denying exemption to an arts organization that allowed artists to profit from classes and 
exhibitions on its premises); Greenwood Cemetery Ass’n of Millville, Inc. v. City of Millville, 
1 N.J. Tax 408, 414 (1980) (denying exemption for cemetery parsonage where an inhabitant 
regularly used it for a side business). 
 86. See AHS Hosp. Corp., 28 N.J. Tax at 534 (collecting cases). 
 87. See, e.g., Essex Props. Urban Renewal Assocs., Inc. v. City of Newark, 20 N.J. Tax 
360, 368, 370 (2002) (confirming federal nonprofit status is irrelevant and concluding that the 
plaintiff provided insufficient evidence that its senior and disabled housing was run in a 
charitable manner); see also supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Initial Statement of Organization Claiming Property Tax Exemption, N.J. DEP’T 
ST., http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pdf/other_forms/lpt/initialstment.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TJ5Q-YSL8] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
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In the leading case for the “dominant motive” test, Kimberley School v. 
Town of Montclair,89 the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified that the 
relevant inquiry was “not so much for . . . whether [a school’s] income 
exceeds the cost of operation in any particular year or years, but rather 
whether charges are fixed with the obvious intention of yielding a profit.”90  
It considered factors that could show inurement to insiders as well as 
excess of income over costs, and the actual and possible use of such excess; 
the existence and extent of [the school’s] accumulated surplus and the 
purpose to which it may be put; . . . the scale of salaries paid to its teachers 
and officials as compared with similar schools, public as well as 
private . . . .91 
These criteria are less clearly defined than those used in federal law.  The 
IRS has issued detailed regulations for calculating reasonable compensation 
to key employees.92  These rules focus on “excess benefit” transactions where 
the charitable organization transfers more than the value of the consideration 
it receives.93  They exclude most initial contracts,94 which allows nonprofits 
to negotiate for top talent.  New Jersey’s factors for evaluating reasonable 
compensation are independent from this scheme and have been more 
restrictively applied.95 
Yet neither surplus revenues nor tuition rates set to produce such is 
evidence of a profit motive, according to an influential case, City of Trenton 
v. State Division of Tax Appeals.96  There, a court evaluating an exemption 
claimed by Rider College (now known as Rider University) held that such 
surpluses represented “plan[ning] on a sound fiscal basis for the replacement 
of antiquated facilities or the expansion of facilities.”97  Importantly, the 
court distinguished the school’s governance and compensation from its past 
practices, noting that it had ceased paying its “vocational advisers” high 
commissions for generating admissions.98 
A more recent case demonstrates that private benefit to outsiders is still a 
significant disqualification in New Jersey.  In Phillipsburg Riverview 
Organization v. Town of Phillipsburg,99 an appellate court affirmed Judge 
Vito Bianco’s decision to deny exemption to a community arts center that let 
artists derive profits for exhibitions, classes, and performances at the 
space.100  Although the plaintiff argued that the question of profit making 
 
 89. 65 A.2d 500 (N.J. 1949). 
 90. Id. at 505. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2012) (taxing excess benefit transactions by nonprofits); Treas. 
Reg. § 53.4958 (2017) (providing definitions and many other specifics). 
 93. See I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1)(A). 
 94. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(c). 
 95. See AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456, 515–25 (2015) 
(rejecting the federal rules as determinative of the reasonableness of salaries and 
compensation). 
 96. 166 A.2d 777 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960). 
 97. Id. at 781–82. 
 98. See id. at 781 n.12. 
 99. 27 N.J. Tax 188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
 100. Id. at 194. 
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should focus on the owning organization,101 the court disagreed.  It noted that 
exemption statutes are read strictly against claimants and held that the 
plaintiff failed to show that “the entire income” from the space would be 
reinvested in the organization.102  Importantly, the “entire income” 
reinvestment requirement applies to properties with a charitable or religious 
exemption but not to educational ones.103 
Other New Jersey cases consider additional factors as evidence of a profit 
motive.  In a recent unpublished opinion, the New Jersey Tax Court found 
above- or at-market rates for ballet classes to be sufficient grounds to deny 
exemption for a dance school building, even though the owner had a broader 
nonprofit purpose it pursued more fully at other locations.104  Although this 
case is not precedential, it shows that reinvesting surpluses from seemingly 
commercial activities at a specific location towards an overall exempt 
purpose may not protect a property-tax exemption because of the interaction 
of the use test and the profit test. 
In a more significant case, AHS Hospital Corp. v. Town of Morristown,105 
Judge Bianco revoked the entire property tax exemption of a large hospital.  
He saw its commercial operations and collaborations with for-profit entities 
as too interwoven with its exempt activities.106  In that case, he applied the 
standard from City of Trenton:  “[I]f [the court] can trace [profit] into 
someone’s personal pocket [the organization will] not be entitled to tax 
exemption.”107 
The most recent edition of the New Jersey Tax Assessors’ Manual requires 
that a parcel be neither owned nor operated for profit,108 but it excepts 
academic properties partially leased to profit-making organizations.  There, 
it allows a partial exemption on the remainder of the building or a complete 
exemption only if the lease (1) lasts less than four months (2) is not a profit-
seeking transaction, (3) is de minimis, and (4) only produces income devoted 
to the organization’s exempt purpose.109  This administrative practice 
suggests that profit limits on academic property are intended to be fairly 
strict. 
 
 101. Id. at 192. 
 102. Id. at 193 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4–3.6 (2017)). 
 103. See supra note 83; infra notes 135–38 and accompanying text. 
 104. Township of Cranbury v. Princeton Ballet Soc’y, No. 010651-2012, 2014 WL 
4417744, at *1 (N.J. Tax Ct. Sept. 3, 2014). 
 105. 28 N.J. Tax 456 (2015). 
 106. Id. at 513. 
 107. Id. at 496 (first and second alterations in original) (quoting City of Trenton v. State 
Div. of Tax Appeals, 166 A.2d 777, 782 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960)). 
 108. See PROP. ADMIN., HANDBOOK FOR NEW JERSEY ASSESSORS 96, 274–78, 297–300 
(2017), http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/pdf/assessorshandbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
HKA9-ZGSD]. 
 109. Id. at 297. 
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2. New Jersey’s De Minimis Exception Has Been 
More Strictly Interpreted than Federal Analogs and Fails 
to Accommodate Complex Business Practices 
New Jersey case law shows that while the “profits test” has been gradually 
modified, its exceptions are narrow.  Older cases demonstrate little tolerance 
for buildings used for multiple purposes, both charitable and commercial.  In 
Greenwood Cemetery Ass’n of Millville, Inc. v. City of Millville,110 the New 
Jersey Tax Court denied exemption for a cemetery parsonage, where the 
caretaker’s wife used it to run a side business selling memorial plaques.111  
The court found that the activity was substantial, not de minimis.112 
Similarly, in Princeton University Press v. Borough of Princeton,113 the 
New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that Princeton University Press’s 
exemption claim failed because its facilities were not exclusively used for 
exempt purposes:  beyond its own academic publishing activity, it regularly 
contracted with various businesses to serve their printing needs.  The court 
held this that “[was] not an occasional or incidental activity, or, if engaged in 
regularly, one which [was] of an inconsequential or de minimis character.”114  
Although the legislature has adjusted the exemption statute since this case, 
making the use test now one of actual rather than exclusive use, the holding 
is still substantially good law. 
These older cases show that, although each prong must be independently 
met,115 there was a great deal of interaction between the profit test and the 
exclusive use test.  Activities that generated a profit for insiders, employees, 
or outsiders were not necessarily suspect because courts were persuaded that 
these proved the “dominant motive” sought in Kimberley School.116  Rather, 
they also demonstrated uses of the property for nonexempt purposes.117 
The newer partial exemption framework is much closer to the 
“fragmentation” principle under UBIT.118  The relevant language allows an 
educational or charitable organization to lease out portions of property to for-
profit institutions or use them for nonexempt activities as long as those 
portions are taxed.119  The parcel-by-parcel nature of property-tax 
exemptions would also seem suited to splitting off nonexempt activities and 
revenues from exempt uses and functions.120  As the parking-lot cases show, 
some profitable uses can be isolated to specific taxed parcels.  Yet the 
 
 110. 1 N.J. Tax 408 (1980). 
 111. Id. at 411, 414. 
 112. Id. at 414. 
 113. 172 A.2d 420 (N.J. 1961). 
 114. Id. at 424. 
 115. See Hunterdon Med. Ctr. v. Township of Readington, 951 A.2d 931, 941 n.13 (N.J. 
2008) (noting the use test is “superfluous” if either of the others is not met). 
 116. Kimberley Sch. v. Town of Montclair, 65 A.2d 500, 505 (N.J. 1949). 
 117. They also do not adhere to the “entire income” reinvestment requirement. See supra 
notes 83, 102 and accompanying text. 
 118. See Stone, supra note 21, at 1488.  Under this concept, the IRS taxes discrete activities, 
like advertising, even if conducted within the broad scope of exempt operations. 
 119. See supra note 3. 
 120. See supra notes 62–73 and accompanying text. 
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complexity of modern business practices puts strain on the partial exemption 
framework. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court directly addressed difficult-to-isolate 
mixtures of commercial and exempt activities in a recent case, International 
Schools Services, Inc. v. West Windsor Township.121  There, a nonprofit 
serving international schools abroad had various partnerships with other 
entities, including some for-profit ones that it leased property to within the 
same complex at below-market rates.122  Although the organization never 
claimed a property-tax exemption for those areas, the court nonetheless found 
the arrangement improper as the support for the for-profit entities was 
commingled in the use of the entire property. 
Similarly, the treatment of joint ventures in AHS diverges significantly 
from federal exemption standards.  Under federal law and many state 
incorporation statutes, joint ventures can be tricky for nonprofits; their 
permissibility can depend on the degree of control by related parties that 
could take the nonprofit beyond the limits of its exempt purposes.123  Many 
such arrangements are possible for nonprofits, however, as nonprofits may 
generally invest their assets in any investments they find prudent.124  As long 
as the joint venture is a separate legal entity and fiduciary responsibilities are 
met, the nonprofit should be able to receive after-tax dividends or profits 
from the subsidiary.125 
Yet, these collaborations, which Judge Bianco described as “labyrinthine 
corporate structures” in AHS,126 present obstacles to maintaining a property-
tax exemption in New Jersey.  The main issue in the case involved 
commingling of uses rather than simply revenues.  Although the fact that 
many of the same actors were involved at highest levels of the collaborations 
and joint ventures raised concerns,127 the main crux was not whether there 
was separate accounting of arms-length transactions.128  Rather, Judge 
Bianco considered how the profit-oriented entities used the property, looking 
for a mixing of exempt uses with for-profit uses such that the property 
benefitted the for-profit actors.129  His analysis included whether particular 
profit-making physicians worked throughout the hospital buildings.130 
 
 121. 21 A.3d 1166 (N.J. 2011). 
 122. Id. at 1178. 
 123. See Dagher, supra note 27, at 3495–98 (discussing the IRS policy on nonprofit 
participation in joint ventures). 
 124. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 552 (McKinney 2017).  Some assets 
may be restricted by deed or contract.  Fiduciary duties also apply to nonprofit board 
investments, while significant disposition of assets may be subject to other regulations. See, 
e.g., §§ 509–510. 
 125. See, e.g., David A. Levitt & Steven R. Chiodini, Taking Care of Business:  Use of a 
For-Profit Subsidiary by a Nonprofit Organization, A.B.A. (June 2014), 
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2014/06/03_levitt.html 
[https://perma.cc/7EFX-BRER]. 
 126. AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456, 465 (2015). 
 127. See id. at 474, 513–14 (noting overlapping high-level personnel and finding it 
impossible to construe the operations as arms-length transactions). 
 128. Id. at 500–02. 
 129. See id. at 501, 506. 
 130. See id. at 501–02. 
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These questions illustrate how hard it is to borrow an income 
fragmentation approach and apply it to a property-tax exemption law like the 
current one in New Jersey.  Assessors can fairly easily separate different 
types of income and selectively apply taxes to certain streams.  This targeted 
taxation is harder with ad valorem taxation of property, where the assessment 
is based on the relative value of an asset.  Scholars of taxation call the real 
property tax a tax on land rent131 but also consider assessment a proxy for 
measuring capital accumulation,132  that is, the increase in wealth attributable 
to increased value or utilization of the property.133  But it is difficult to break 
out a piece of increased value and attribute it to a commercial or profitable 
use of the property, particularly if this use cannot be physically demarcated. 
Finding it impossible to make such a demarcation, Judge Bianco denied 
the hospital the property-tax exemption.  In reaching this holding, he tackled 
the hospital’s assertion that it would mean “the traditional and historic means 
by which hospitals throughout New Jersey provided hospital services will 
have always violated the Statute and the Statute is a nullity.”134  Discussing 
the legislative history and case law on hospital exemptions, he concluded that 
there was no endorsement of profit making by hospitals when the exemption 
was codified.135 
Here, he noted an early case, Bancroft Training School v. Borough of 
Haddonfield,136 which examined the shift from an 1895 statute to one enacted 
in 1903.  The former exempted certain institutions solely on their 
incorporation status, while the latter included the “not conducted for profit” 
limit on academic property and the “entire income” reinvestment requirement 
for charitable exemption.137  The New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned there 
that this clearly demonstrated “the legislative purpose . . . to exclude . . . 
enterprises which may be benevolent in spirit, but which are conducted for 
private gain.”138 
This was a landscape of obstacles for Princeton University in Fields, given 
its technical collaborations and many partnership investments.139  Although 
 
 131. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 413 (5th ed. 1989). 
 132. See id. at 411–13 (contrasting benefit theory with land rent); id. at 417–18 (discussing 
market-value assessment); id. at 419–21 (illustrating how these dynamics affect capital); see 
also Mieszkowski & Zodrow, supra note 53, at 1099–101, 1140–41 (modeling theories of real 
property taxation and concluding that the scale of the inquiry, that is, metropolitan, regional, 
or national, affects accuracy, but that nationally property taxation depresses returns to capital, 
while land rents may be regionally efficient). 
 133. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 131, at 417–18. 
 134. AHS Hosp. Corp. v. Town of Morristown, 28 N.J. Tax 456, 479 (2015). 
 135. See id. at 494–95 (discussing the statute that first introduced a hospital exemption).  
The court noted that “[p]erhaps this reflects . . . recognition of the evolving importance of 
hospitals . . . and the differing purposes between hospital uses and charitable uses. . . .  [Yet] 
it is clear that the Legislature in 1913 did not condone the use of hospital property for-profit.” 
Id. 
 136. 82 A. 20 (N.J. 1911); see also AHS Hosp. Corp., 28 N.J. Tax at 491. 
 137. Bancroft Training Sch., 82 A. at 21. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Princeton University’s Form 990-T filing for 2015 lists multiple partnership 
agreements as well as unrelated business taxable income of negative $34,221,249. Trs. of 
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the “entire income” limit applies only to organizations with “charitable, 
benevolent or religious” use exemptions,140 academic institutions are subject 
to the “not conducted for profit” requirement.141  This distinction might have 
meant that the court would view profit to outsiders or faculty less strictly, yet 
continuing the litigation could have been risky for Princeton University.  
Furthermore, Judge Bianco was presiding, and he showed no willingness in 
AHS to accede to legislative acquiescence to business practices in the sector.  
As such, property-tax exemption laws and judicial interpretations of them 
have created a precarious compliance landscape for nonprofits with 
budgetary concerns. 
3.  Some Other State Laws Operate in a Similar Way 
While New Jersey’s charitable and educational property-tax exemptions 
are quite narrow, they are not unique:  several other states apply profit tests 
to property-tax exemptions.  Ohio’s exemption for colleges and academies 
specifically includes a profit limitation.142  The state’s limits on other 
charitable or educational institutions are weaker yet also apply a profit limit 
on leased property.143 
Profit motive plays a central role in Ohio property-tax exemption law, yet 
the test applied is somewhat more lenient than in New Jersey.  Under Ohio’s 
standard, “profit is defined as the excess of price over cost,”144 but courts 
distinguish between the mere presence of surpluses and “a view to profit.”145  
This standard was set by an early Ohio decision, which extended statutory 
property-tax exemptions to private schools as purely public charities 
precisely because such schools might be run “without any view to profit.”146  
Under this principle, Ohio courts have judged lease terms harshly.147  Yet 
 
Princeton Univ., Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax (2015 Form 990-T) (on 
file with Princeton University, Office of the Treasurer, Tax Department). 
 140. See supra notes 83, 102, 137 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra notes 83, 137 and accompanying text.  Any creation of intellectual property, 
even beyond Bayh-Dole Act activities, could pose property-tax problems if faculty were bound 
by holdings like that in Phillipsburg Riverview Organization v. Town of Phillipsburg, 27 N.J. 
Tax 188, 194 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying 
text. 
 142. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.07(A)(4) (West 2017) (exempting “[p]ublic 
colleges and academies . . . not used with a view to profit”). 
 143. See id. § 5709.121(A)(2) (exempting indirect use only if the property is “under the 
direction or control of such institution . . . for use in furtherance of or incidental to its 
charitable, educational, or public purposes and not with the view to profit”). 
 144. 250 Shoup Mill, L.L.C. v. Testa, 60 N.E.3d 1254, 1259 (Ohio 2016); see also Seven 
Hills Sch. v. Kinney, 503 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ohio 1986) (defining profit similarly, but noting 
“[t]he legislature is of course free to define profit in any manner it sees fit”). 
 145. See Craftsmen Recreation Club, Inc. v. Testa, 31 N.E.3d 154, 157 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2015). 
 146. Gerke v. Purcell, 25 Ohio St. 229, 247 (1874) (noting that “private property . . . is 
often used for . . . education, like property in ordinary business, as a means of profit”). 
 147. See, e.g., 250 Shoup Mill, 60 N.E.3d at 1255 (denying exemption even where lessor 
funneled profits to lessees because Ohio “bars a claim of vicarious exemption”); 
Anderson/Maltbie P’ship v. Levin, 937 N.E.2d 547, 554 (Ohio 2010) (noting profit to either 
the lessor or the lessee voids exemption). 
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they also broadly allow exemptions for activities reasonably necessary to a 
charitable or educational purpose, such as restaurants,148 parking lots,149 and 
a Girl Scout memorabilia store.150 
Ohio law specifically determines that a scientific research organization 
will be considered charitable and educational even if it “operates in a manner 
that results in an excess of revenues over expenses”151 as long as the surplus 
is reinvested toward its exempt purposes.  The law further specifies that “any 
scientific information diffused by the organization . . . of particular . . . benefit 
to any of its individual members [shall not] be used to deny the exemption . . . 
provided [that it] is available to the public for purchase or otherwise.”152  It 
is unclear whether these provisions are congruent with the Bayh-Dole Act,153 
as they seem primarily aimed at undoing the holding in American Society for 
Metals v. Limbach,154 where the Ohio Supreme Court had strictly applied a 
profit test to deny exemption to a scientific membership society with ongoing 
net positive income from publications, conferences, and lectures.155 
Pennsylvania places high statutory and constitutional barriers to tax 
exemption.156  The state constitution limits exemptions to only “[i]nstitutions 
of purely public charity, but in the case of any real property tax exemptions 
only that portion of real property of such institution which is actually and 
regularly used for the purposes of the institution.”157  Academic property 
should fall within these general bounds.158  Pennsylvania courts apply a five-
part test, which has been codified,159 to an organization claiming an 
exemption: 
(1) it must advance a charitable purpose; (2) it must donate or render 
gratuitously a substantial portion of its services; (3) it must benefit a 
substantial and indefinite class of persons who are legitimate subjects of 
charity; (4) it must relieve the government of some of its burden; and (5) it 
must operate entirely free from private profit motive.160 
 
 148. See Ohio N. Univ. v. Tax Comm’r, 255 N.E.2d 297, 299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1970). 
 149. See Bowers v. Akron City Hosp., 243 N.E.2d 95, 97 (Ohio 1968) (exempting hospital 
parking lot with positive revenue where fees ensured patients and doctors rather than the public 
could use it). 
 150. See Girl Scouts-Great Trail Council v. Levin, 862 N.E.2d 493, 496 (Ohio 2007). 
 151. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.12(D)(1) (West 2017). 
 152. Id.  This special provision is also tied to an exit tax on such property when sold to a 
nonexempt entity. See id. § 5709.12(D)(2). 
 153. See infra Parts I.C, II. 
 154. 569 N.E.2d 1065 (Ohio 1991). 
 155. Id. at 1067. 
 156. See Gallagher, supra note 19, at 13–14. 
 157. See PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2. 
 158. See Gallagher, supra note 19, at 4. 
 159. See Institutions of Purely Public Charity Act of 1997, 10 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 371–385 (West 2016). 
 160. Fayette Res., Inc. v. Fayette Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 107 A.3d 839, 845 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2014). 
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This is a high bar, yet the test distinguishes between reinvested surpluses 
and money flowing to private individuals.161  The courts acknowledge that 
“tax-exempt charitable institutions will have revenue, including surplus 
revenue, but . . . it is how such revenue is used that will determine whether it 
evidences a private profit motive.”162 
In City of Washington v. Board of Assessment Appeals,163 the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that a nonprofit college had satisfied 
the profit prong as it neither compensated trustees nor distributed any profits 
or dividends to any individuals.164  The school’s finances also showed that it 
provided education below cost.165  The test’s codification carved out “state-
related universities”166 but left other colleges subject to its burdens.  Many 
nonprofits make PILOTs to satisfy it.167 
Minnesota applies a six-part test, looking at the nonprofit corporation’s 
purpose, its reliance on donations, and charging of fees, as well as the 
presence of profits to the organization, an open class of beneficiaries 
reasonably related to the charitable purposes, and distributions to private 
entities of any material dividends or profits either during the undertaking or 
on dissolution.168  This test was set forth in North Star Research Institute v. 
County of Hennepin,169 which predates the Bayh-Dole Act and deals directly 
with scientific research and external partnerships between nonprofits and for-
profit companies.  In North Star, the Minnesota Supreme Court focused on 
the fact that a research institute gave marketplace advantages and proprietary 
interests in subsequent patents to private businesses.170  Furthermore, the 
organization could not demonstrate that these agreements covered an 
insubstantial fraction of the research.171  The court denied the property-tax 
exemption.172 
Although a recent case clarified that the North Star factors are not a 
multiprong test,173 the same case also denied property-tax exemptions to 
charitable organizations that charge fees.174  In North Star, the court did not 
examine the test factors closely as the case represented a departure from then-
standard charitable practice.175  Instead, the court distinguished between 
 
 161. See id. at 846; In re Dunwoody Vill., 52 A.3d 408, 422–23 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) 
(denying exemption where retirement community executives received annual bonuses for 
financial performance). 
 162. Wilson Area Sch. Dist. v. Easton Hosp., 747 A.2d 877, 880 (Pa. 2000). 
 163. 704 A.2d 120 (Pa. 1997). 
 164. Id. at 125–26. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See 10 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 374 (West 2016). 
 167. See Pamela Leland, PILOTs:  The Large City Experience, in PROPERTY-TAX 
EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES, supra note 19, at 193, 195. 
 168. See N. Star Research Inst. v. County of Hennepin, 236 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Minn. 1975). 
 169. 236 N.W.2d 754 (Minn. 1975). 
 170. Id. at 755. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. See Under the Rainbow Child Care Ctr., Inc. v. County of Goodhue, 741 N.W.2d 880, 
885 (Minn. 2007) (noting that “North Star did not establish six mandatory elements”). 
 174. See id. at 886. 
 175. See N. Star, 236 N.W.2d at 757. 
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indirect economic benefits to society from increased innovation and direct 
public benefits from fostering and making abstract knowledge publicly 
available.176  Furthermore, it saw creating competitive advantages for outside 
partners as stretching the concept of a charitable purpose beyond the breaking 
point.177 
C.  The Bayh-Dole Act Complicates This Framework 
State property-tax exemptions with profit tests would be more restrictive 
than federal regulation of business activities by nonprofits, particularly in the 
academic context, if strictly enforced.  Many state-level property-exemption 
statutes seem out of sync with the modern “knowledge economy,”178 where 
research universities develop key innovations that drive American economic 
growth.179  Much of this shift is traceable to the 1980 adoption of a federal 
law to accelerate commercializing such research.180  The fact that so many 
of these profit tests were established in case law before Bayh-Dole activities 
became such a significant part of the economy indicates that this is an area 
of law that deserves reevaluation. 
The University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act,181 better known 
as the Bayh-Dole Act, was intended “to promote collaboration between 
commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities; . . . 
[and] to promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions 
made in the United States . . . .”182  The law gave universities a green light to 
exploit patents invented by faculty and staff, to remit a portion of the 
proceeds as royalties to the inventors, and to license the patents to small 
businesses.183 
The Act’s required royalties resemble a share of profits that would 
otherwise violate the nondistribution constraint, while the preference for 
small businesses similarly appears to convey private benefits on those 
 
 176. See id. at 757–58. 
 177. See id. at 758. 
 178. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE KNOWLEDGE-
BASED ECONOMY (1996), https://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/1913021.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S79A-H5EJ]; Walter W. Powell & Kaisa Snellman, The Knowledge 
Economy, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 199 (2004). 
 179. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, Universities as Innovation Drivers, in BEST 
PRACTICES IN STATE AND REGIONAL INNOVATION INITIATIVES:  COMPETING IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 49 (Charles W. Wessner ed., 2013); see also Hansmann, supra note 16, at 835 n.1; 
Christopher M. Kelly, Book Note, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 521, 522–23, 527–28 (1995) 
(reviewing ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE:  CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN 
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994)).  But see Powell & Snellman, supra note 178, at 
204–06, 214–16 (noting that this pattern correlates with weak labor productivity and uneven 
growth). 
 180. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation et al. in 
Support of Stanford’s Petition for Certiorari at 1, 8–9, Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior 
Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011) (No. 09-1159). 
 181. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2012). 
 182. Id. § 200 (emphasis added). 
 183. See id. § 207(c)(7) (providing “a requirement that the contractor share royalties with 
the inventor” and a requirement that “a preference in the licensing of subject inventions shall 
be given to small business firms”). 
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organizations.184  Yet, as the U.S. Supreme Court clarified in Board of 
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, 
Inc.,185 Bayh-Dole does not mandate such activities but rather authorizes 
them with guidelines and restrictions tied to federal funds.186  In another case, 
a federal district court held that the law was not intended to precisely regulate 
the relationship between universities and faculty inventors.187  Although the 
regulations impose standard contract clauses as the general norm,188 it is well 
established that the royalty requirement does not set a minimum rate of 
disbursement.189  It is not clear, however, whether the elective nature of 
Bayh-Dole implicates some proportionality test for nonprofits vis-à-vis either 
the extent of other exempt purposes or the size of private benefits conferred 
to for-profit businesses.190 
The Bayh-Dole Act succeeded in spurring the changes it sought.  One 
study found annual patents granted to universities expanded from 380 in 1980 
to 3088 in 2009.191  The Association of University Technology Managers, 
founded in 1974, now counts over three thousand members.192  Economists 
estimate the law’s positive impact in the tens of billions of dollars.193  Still, 
critics charge that these benefits have concentrated in relatively few hands, 
accruing primarily to corporate shareholders, patent holders, and university 
endowments.194 
 
 184. See id.  Other federal statutes also incentivize partnerships between nonprofits and 
for-profit businesses. See, e.g., Bradley Myers, The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit:  A 
Proposal to Address IRS Concerns Regarding Partnerships Between Non-Profit and For-
Profit Entities, 60 TAX LAW. 415, 415 (2007). 
 185. 563 U.S. 776 (2011). 
 186. Id. at 787; see also Christopher S. Hayter & Jacob H. Rooksby, A Legal Perspective 
on University Technology Transfer, 41 J. TECH. TRANSFER 270, 279 (2016). 
 187. See Fenn v. Yale Univ., 393 F. Supp. 2d 133, 141–42 (D. Conn. 2004), aff’d, 184 F. 
App’x 21 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 188. See 37 C.F.R. § 401.3 (2017). 
 189. See Platzer v. Sloan-Kettering Inst. for Cancer Research, 787 F. Supp. 360, 367–68 
(S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 983 F.2d 1086 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 190. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 207(a)(3) (2012) (requiring federal agencies to license only federally 
owned inventions through transactions in the public interest); see also Colombo, supra note 
27, at 1066 (arguing private benefit should be curtailed where “the charity enters into a 
transaction with a for-profit entity . . . involving [the charity’s] core services that confers a 
competitive advantage on the for-profit in its own business activities”). 
 191. See Howard Markel, Patents, Profits, and the American People—The Bayh–Dole Act 
of 1980, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 794, 794 (2013); see also Hayter & Rooksby, supra note 186, 
at 271 (discussing trends). 
 192. See About AUTM, ASS’N U. TECH. MANAGERS, http://www.autm.net/autm-info/about-
autm/ [https://perma.cc/8MQE-JCBX] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 193. See Markel, supra note 191, at 794. 
 194. See JACOB H. ROOKSBY, THE BRANDING OF THE AMERICAN MIND:  HOW UNIVERSITIES 
CAPTURE, MANAGE, AND MONETIZE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND WHY IT MATTERS 9, 132–
43, 151 (2016).  See generally Amy Kapczynski, Addressing Global Health Inequalities:  An 
Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031 (2005); 
Rachael A. Ream, Nonprofit Commercialization Under Bayh-Dole and the Academic 
Anticommons, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1343 (2008). 
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1.  Bayh-Dole Activities Can Fit Within the Federal Exemption 
Is the Bayh-Dole framework a rational exception from the overall legal 
system guiding nonprofit activities?  The Bayh-Dole Act seems to discount 
the possibility that it might conflict with the tax code.  It takes precedence 
over other laws, yet omits § 501(c)(3) from a long list of affected statutes.195  
It does contemplate interaction between the two, however, as its definition 
for “nonprofit organization” includes organizations tax exempt under 
§ 501(c)(3).196  Yet its definition is broader than a reference to that section, 
which indicates that the meaning of this term is not controlled by the tax code. 
The overall goals of the Bayh-Dole Act are tied to ideas of public benefit.  
It incentivizes research useful to society but also encourages it to occur at 
nonprofits, where researchers may be more likely to pursue foundational 
inquiries and engage in teaching.  Furthermore, the prior system was 
criticized for wasting valuable publicly funded innovations.197 
The current federal tax law presents no real conflict with Bayh-Dole.  The 
framework of intermediate sanctions for excess-benefit transactions coupled 
with UBIT can accommodate the likely collaborations.  Income from 
partnerships can be structured as passive investment income, income 
substantially related to a university or research institute’s exempt 
purposes,198 or UBIT.199  Many faculty inventors likely have royalty 
agreements covered by the initial contract exception to excess benefit 
transactions.200  Others will not even be disqualified persons under the law if 
they do not run departments or laboratories or exercise significant control of 
the organization.201 
The remaining question is whether other private benefits to outsiders and 
nondisqualified employees should be considered necessary byproducts of the 
modern scientific research institution.202  The intent of the Bayh-Dole Act to 
foster such efforts reveals no great qualms on the issue, and IRS policy 
decisions reflect this.203  Even if the collaborative structures for licensing 
patents necessarily create substantial private benefits, this is likely 
 
 195. See 35 U.S.C. § 210. 
 196. See id. § 201(i). 
 197. See Markel, supra note 191, at 794 (noting estimates that only 5 percent of such 
patents reached the market). 
 198. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (2017); IIT Research Inst. v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 
13, 21 (1985) (construing a research institute’s income from work carried out for industrial 
clients as substantially related to its exempt purpose). 
 199. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(5); see also Peter D. Blumberg, Comment, 
From “Publish or Perish” to “Profit or Perish”:  Revenues from University Technology 
Transfer and the § 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 89, 93–94 (1996) (arguing 
some Bayh-Dole income should be taxable under UBIT). 
 200. See supra note 94 and accompanying text; see also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 85-01-
082 (Oct. 10, 1984) (allowing a foundation to create a for-profit subsidiary whose joint-owners 
would be researchers recruited via equity shares). 
 201. See I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3 (2017). 
 202. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987); see also I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 
85-01-082 (Oct. 10, 1984) (construing private benefit to the related for-profit entity as 
“entirely incidental to the major purpose and effect of the proposed transaction”). 
 203. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,598 (Jan. 23, 1987). 
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permissible under federal law:  internal IRS guidance states that a nonprofit 
may create qualitatively incidental private benefits if these are “a necessary 
concomitant of the activity which benefits the public at large, i.e., the activity 
can be accomplished only by benefiting certain private individuals.”204 
The elective nature of the Act—that is, the fact that universities and other 
nonprofits are only bound by Bayh-Dole to the extent that they choose to 
patent federally funded research205—means that questions of proportionality 
may emerge.  How much benefit to outside partners or faculty inventors 
would be too much?  There does not appear to be a single case where a 
nonprofit acting in accordance with Bayh-Dole has lost federal tax exemption 
on private-benefit grounds.  The new excise taxes on high compensation to 
key nonprofit employees and on very large university endowments,206 
however, show some willingness from Congress and the federal government 
to rein in the generation and distribution of wealth in the sector.  It is possible 
that some border-drawing enforcement could occur. 
2.  The Federal Nondistribution Constraint 
Is Weaker and More Flexible than State Profit Tests 
Because the federal framework looks for excess benefit or private 
inurement to insiders, or substantial private benefit to outsiders,207 the 
required royalty distributions under Bayh-Dole can be structured so that even 
significant regular payouts could be permissible.208  Although large annual 
remittances may seem like profit sharing to casual observers, the IRS likely 
would not agree.  The interaction between the Bayh-Dole Act and local 
property-tax exemptions is more complicated. 
 
 204. Id.  For state-level exemptions IRS positions would not control, see, e.g., North Star 
Research Institute v. County of Hennepin, 236 N.W.2d 754, 757 (Minn. 1975) (denying a pre-
Bayh-Dole arrangement as only creating remote public benefits while directly allowing “a 
person or corporation [to] gain[] a profit or commercial advantage as the immediate and 
intended direct consequence of the ‘charity’”). 
 205. See supra notes 185–86 and accompanying text. 
 206. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, §§ 13602, 13701, 131 Stat. 
2054 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 4960); see also Ray Gronberg, Congress Throws Flag on Duke 
for Paying Krzyzewski and Cutcliffe as Much as It Does, HERALD SUN (Dec. 26, 2017, 6:00 
AM), http://www.heraldsun.com/news/local/counties/durham-county/article191416419.html 
[https://perma.cc/NT86-XGBX]; Jamie D. Halper, Harvard to Pay “Unprecedented” 
Endowment Tax, CRIMSON (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2017/12/20/ 
endowment-tax-passed/ [https://perma.cc/7982-DHPC]; Ben Myers & Brock Read, If 
Republicans Get Their Way, These Colleges Would See Their Endowments Taxed, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 5, 2017, 11:31 AM), https://www.chronicle.com/article/If-Republicans-
Get-Their-Way/241659 [https://perma.cc/V42X-27A4] (tabulating schools affected, with 
Princeton at the top); Jake Novak, How Tax Reform Will End the Nonprofit Executive Pay 
Scam, CNBC (Dec. 20, 2017, 2:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/20/tax-reform-
smacks-down-excessive-nonprofit-executive-pay-commentary.html [https://perma.cc/46GW-
4NXN]; Dan Spinelli, Under the Final GOP Tax Plan, Penn Will Pay a Landmark Excise Tax 
on Its Endowment, DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN (Dec. 22, 2017, 12:44 AM), 
http://www.thedp.com/article/2017/12/republican-tax-plan-trump-upenn-graduate-students-
endowment-gutmann [https://perma.cc/LAU2-2YA6]. 
 207. See supra notes 27–30, 67 and accompanying text. 
 208. See supra notes 30, 92–94, 200–02 and accompanying text. 
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The substance of the complaint in Fields targeted the university’s 
commercial incomes, particularly its patents and licenses, examining 
revenues and alleged profit sharing with both the faculty whose research 
produced the patents as well as outside corporate partners.209  The plaintiffs 
alleged that the university received over $500 million in such revenue over 
nine years210 and shared over $100 million of it with faculty211 in a way that 
would seem to violate the “nondistribution constraint” applied by state 
law.212  They also alleged that the university made its research facilities 
available to private corporations through rental agreements, licensing 
agreements, and joint ventures.213 
For the purpose of evaluating a property-tax exemption, should it matter 
that a university structures hiring, retention, and resource investment around 
financially beneficial patent-development systems?214  Or should the key 
considerations be the size of the royalty compensations to inventors?215  
Should a court consider the direct use of shared facilities by joint ventures?216  
Or should it focus on the ability of outside partners in joint ventures to benefit 
from the research use of laboratories and other facilities by the university’s 
own employees?217  As there do not seem to be directly related property-tax 
exemption cases decided on the merits since the enactment of Bayh-Dole,218 
it is difficult to say what standards should apply.  Yet it appears that 
nonprofits engaging in significant Bayh-Dole activities could forfeit 
property-tax exemptions if statutory profit tests were strictly enforced as 
barriers to employees or outside partners making a substantial profitable use 
of an otherwise exempt property. 
II.  THE POLICY CONFLICT BETWEEN 
THE BAYH-DOLE ACT AND STATE PROFIT TESTS 
This Part focuses on whether there is a legal conflict between the Bayh-
Dole Act and profit tests applied to state-level charitable and educational 
property-tax exemptions.  Part II.A explains that Bayh-Dole should not be 
 
 209. See 2016 Complaint, supra note 6, at 2–12; see also Ollwerther, supra note 3. 
 210. See Complaint at 3, Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 28 N.J. Tax 574 (2015) (No. 
7556-15) [hereinafter 2015 Complaint]; Young, supra note 13. 
 211. See 2015 Complaint, supra note 210, at 3; see also Anna Merriman, 24 More Residents 
Challenge Princeton U.’s Tax Exempt Status, NJ.COM (Apr. 6, 2016, 4:29 PM), 
http://www.nj.com/mercer/index.ssf/2016/04/24_more_residents_challenge_princeton_us_ta
x_exemp.html [https://perma.cc/L4TH-5TPP]; Ollwerther, supra note 3. 
 212. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.6 (West 2017); Hansmann, supra note 31, at 501. 
 213. See 2015 Complaint, supra note 210, at 2. 
 214. See Janet Rae-Dupree, When Academia Puts Profit Ahead of Wonder, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/technology/07unbox.html 
[https://perma.cc/9VNW-Z7N3]; see, e.g., Office of Technology Licensing, PRINCETON U. 
(May 16, 2017), https://www.princeton.edu/patents/ [https://perma.cc/F3GA-KBFV] 
(providing an overview of Princeton University’s patenting and licensing efforts). 
 215. See 2016 Complaint, supra note 6, at 3–5; cf. Manny, supra note 67, at 747–50. 
 216. See supra notes 123–30 and accompanying text. 
 217. See supra notes 99–103, 113–14 and accompanying text. 
 218. American Society for Metals v. Limbach dealt with revenue from conferences, 
lectures, and publications, rather than patents. See Am. Soc’y for Metals v. Limbach, 569 
N.E.2d 1065, 1067 (Ohio 1991); supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
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construed as preempting state-level laws on educational and charitable 
property-tax exemptions and argues that although patent regulations are 
reserved to federal law, local property tax exemptions are independent 
expressions of state sovereignty. 
Part II.B then clarifies that dormant Commerce Clause concerns should not 
act as a bar to the persistence of these two disparate systems.  Part II.C warns, 
however, that there are strong policy arguments in favor of greater alignment 
between federal and state-level tax exemptions and that there are negative 
practical consequences of nonalignment. 
A.  The Bayh-Dole Act Should Not 
Preempt Local Property-Tax Exemptions 
Although there is a great deal of tension between the aims of the Bayh-
Dole Act and state-imposed restrictions on the revenue-generating activities 
of nonprofits, there is likely no legal conflict between these two systems of 
incentives and regulations.  The following Part addresses the question of 
express and implied preemption over state law.  Part II.A.1 concludes that 
there is no express preemption, while Part II.A.2 presents reasons why there 
should be no implied preemption. 
1.  There Is No Express Preemption 
The Bayh-Dole Act does not expressly preempt state tax-exemption laws, 
although it may preempt state nonprofit incorporation laws.  The Bayh-Dole 
Act specifically contemplates the nature of nonprofit corporations as 
creatures of state law.  It defines “nonprofit organization” to include 
“universities and other institutions of higher education or an organization of 
the type described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code . . . or 
any nonprofit scientific or educational organization qualified under a State 
nonprofit organization statute.”219  This definition could be seen to defer to 
state law qualifications for such organizations, or rather to preempt those 
rules to the extent that they might clash with Bayh-Dole.  On the one hand, 
Congress clearly meant to set a national policy for all such organizations, and 
it is fairly clear that Congress intended that an otherwise qualified nonprofit 
should not lose its nonprofit status due to its engagement in Bayh-Dole 
activities.  On the other hand, however, federal nonprofit status does not 
create a general entitlement to property-tax exemptions at the state level, and 
Congress made no mention of state-based tax exemptions in Bayh-Dole. 
2.  There Is Likely No Implied Preemption 
The next steps in preemption analysis involve examining whether state law 
might have been implicitly displaced by Congress.220  Such preemption can 
 
 219. 35 U.S.C. § 201(i) (2012). 
 220. See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (finding implicit 
preemption when a federal law’s scope “indicates that Congress intended [it] to occupy a field 
exclusively,” or when “state law is in actual conflict” with it, or “where it is ‘impossible for a 
private party to comply with both state and federal requirements,’ . . . or where state law 
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occur when the state law intrudes on a field that is reserved for Congress or 
which Congress has occupied.221  Implied preemption may also occur if the 
state law directly conflicts with or frustrates the federal law.222  Congress has 
the power to shape and encourage particular economic activities.223  
Deference would seem to be all the more warranted here as patents are 
reserved to federal law under the Progress of Science and Useful Arts 
Clause.224  Nonetheless, as taxation is a strong expression of state 
sovereignty,225 it is a stretch to say that federal patent law should necessarily 
preempt state tax-exemption law. 
Furthermore, even though there is tension between Bayh-Dole and state 
property-tax exemptions, it is clear that the latter do not directly regulate the 
same subject or field as Bayh-Dole.226  Courts resolving disputes tied to the 
Bayh-Dole Act or patents have refused to dismiss state-law claims.  One 
district court noted that “states are not precluded from enforcing 
complementary laws that may involve patent issues.”227  It quoted Aronson 
v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,228 where the Supreme Court held “[s]tate law is 
not displaced merely because the contract relates to intellectual property 
which may or may not be patentable . . . .”229  Because these state property-
tax exemptions, which determine an organization’s tax liability to a local 
sovereign, do not clearly intrude into the regulation of intellectual property, 
they need not be preempted, despite Bayh-Dole’s reference to state-level not-
for-profit corporation statutes. 
 
‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress.’” (citation omitted) (first quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 
(1990); then quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))). 
 221. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401, 403 (2012) (denying Arizona 
any authority to establish immigration laws that it argued were complementary to federal 
immigration law). 
 222. See id. at 399–400. 
 223. It can do so under either the Commerce Clause or through its spending power. 
Compare Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (approving the regulation of home-grown 
marijuana as an economic activity), with South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) 
(“Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds . . . .”). 
 224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  See generally Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the 
Progress of Science and Useful Arts:  The Anatomy of a Congressional Power, 43 IDEA 1 
(2002).  But see generally Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External 
Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329 (2012) (arguing that this clause limits congressional power). 
 225. Compare Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 311 (1997) (“Indeed, ‘in taxation, 
even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification.’” 
(quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940))), with Princeton Univ. Press v. 
Borough of Princeton, 172 A.2d 420, 422 (N.J. 1961) (“[O]rdinarily all property shall bear its 
just and equal share of the public burden of taxation.  As the existence of government is a 
necessity, taxes are demanded and received in order for government to function.” (citations 
omitted)). 
 226. Cf. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 402 (2012) (“[T]he basic premise of field 
preemption—[is] that States may not enter, in any respect, an area the Federal Government 
has reserved for itself.”).  The federal government has never attempted to reserve local 
property taxation for itself. 
 227. Fenn v. Yale Univ., 393 F. Supp. 2d 133, 141 (D. Conn. 2004), aff’d, 184 F. App’x 
21 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 228. 440 U.S. 257 (1979). 
 229. Id. 
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Preemption may also be implied through the nature of the conflict between 
the laws in question.  If the state law makes it impossible for a person or 
corporation to comply with both the state and federal law, the state law will 
be preempted.230  Similarly, if a state’s legal scheme is so at odds with the 
federal one that it fundamentally frustrates the federal purpose, the state laws 
will be preempted.231  Here, it would be possible for a university or research 
institute to rigorously engage in Bayh-Dole activities while complying with 
state laws even in a state with a very strict “profit test” as long as it is willing 
to forgo property-tax exemption.  It could still retain federal income-tax 
exemption as well as other benefits of nonprofit status.  Furthermore, 
although the Constitution bars state interference with patent regulation, so far 
there is insufficient evidence that incidence of real property taxes on 
universities and research institutes would necessarily frustrate Congress’s 
goals for Bayh-Dole.232  Indeed, the recent endowment excise tax may 
indicate that some additional incidence of tax on universities with large 
revenues should not be construed as frustrating Congress’s purpose of 
promoting the commercialization of patentable research.233 
Thus, the apparent conflict between Bayh-Dole and state-level profit tests 
can be resolved by distinguishing between laws governing state-level 
incorporation from those governing property tax.  Because the latter are 
independent, Bayh-Dole’s definitional reference to nonprofit corporate status 
need not encompass them. 
B.  Dormant Commerce Clause Concerns 
Do Not Invalidate These State Laws 
Dormant Commerce Clause concerns also do not present a legal barrier to 
the persistence of the tension between the federal and state-level regimes, 
although they do have a persuasive role.  Exemptions, including property-tax 
exemptions, can violate the dormant Commerce Clause.234  If exemptions 
merely encourage domestic industry, they generally survive under the 
“legitimate local interest” standard unless conditioned on further 
 
 230. See Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399–400. 
 231. See id. 
 232. But see Abhiroop Mukherjee, Manpreet Singh & Alminas Žaldokas, Do Corporate 
Taxes Hinder Innovation?, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 195–96 (2017) (examining the effects of 
increases in state corporate tax rates on the patenting and research activity of for-profit 
corporations). 
 233. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.  It is worth noting, however, that 
subsequent legislation is disfavored as a guide to Congress’s original purpose for any statutory 
scheme still in effect. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 310 (1960) (explaining 
in this taxpayer dispute that “subsequent legislative developments [do not] change the view 
we have of the statute”).  The Court also warned that “the views of a subsequent Congress 
form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one.” Id. at 313. 
 234. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 574 (1997) 
(striking an exemption limited to nonprofits serving Maine residents and stating that “[a] tax 
on real estate, like any other tax, may impermissibly burden interstate commerce” and that 
“the States may [not] impose real estate taxes in a manner that discriminates against interstate 
commerce”). 
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discrimination against interstate commerce or consumers.235  Still, even 
seemingly neutral statutes may not create disproportionate burdens on 
interstate commerce.236  As with preemption, there is as yet insufficient 
evidence that profit tests on real property tax exemptions create such burdens. 
C.  Practical Considerations Argue Against Nonalignment 
There are strong policy arguments in favor of greater alignment between 
federal and state-level tax exemptions.  When a certain way of doing business 
is encouraged by Congress, is widespread across the entire sector and nation, 
and plays a significant role in defining the modern university, it deserves 
acknowledgment at the state and local levels.  Universities compete for top 
talent across state lines and international borders.  Their ability to do so is an 
economic engine for municipalities, regions, and nations.237 
Whether such patent commercialization activities should be encouraged, 
forbidden, or permitted subject to partial taxation is a large policy question 
rather than a narrow issue of statutory interpretation.  The Bayh-Dole Act 
was a dramatic change when introduced.238  Since then, it has been 
heralded239 and criticized240 for its effects on academia and the broader 
economy.  Skeptics, including a former president of Harvard,241 worry that 
commercialization of academia has a corrosive effect on higher education.242  
Critics point to low pay for adjunct faculty243 and graduate-student 
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 239. See Opinion, supra note 238. 
 240. See ROOKSBY, supra note 194, at 142–44, 175; JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, 
INC.:  THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 148–52 (2005); 
Sweeney, supra note 238, at 296–97. 
 241. See Blumberg, supra note 199, at 91.  See generally Risa L. Lieberwitz, The Marketing 
of Higher Education:  The Price of the University’s Soul, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 763 (2004) 
(reviewing DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE:  THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION (2003)). 
 242. See generally WASHBURN, supra note 240. 
 243. See, e.g., Kim Clark, Does It Matter That Your Professor Is Part Time?, U.S. NEWS 
(Nov. 7, 2008, 4:46 PM), https://www.usnews.com/education/articles/2008/11/07/does-it-
matter-that-your-professor-is-part-time [https://perma.cc/AB4Z-VPA7]; Kate Guarino, 
Adjunct Faculty Seek to Unionize, DAILY TROJAN (Apr. 15, 2015), http://dailytrojan.com/on-
the-money/#tab-id-3 [https://perma.cc/T3VQ-LMM2]. 
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instructors,244 high student debts,245 and profit-oriented research246 as 
outcomes of commercialization.  Such concerns have spurred campaigns for 
labor rights on campus,247 increased regulation of for-profit colleges,248 and 
the new excises taxes on very large university endowments249 as well as on 
individual compensation to nonprofit employees who earn more than $1 
million a year.250  Elite nonprofit universities face pressure from a society 
uncertain about the public benefits they create.  The fact that they gain 
support not only from tax exemptions but also from direct public funding via 
research grants and tuition support heightens the pressure.251 
Academic commercialization, though exacerbated by Bayh-Dole, cannot 
be traced solely to it.  Commercialization is widespread not only in academia 
but also throughout the nonprofit sector.252  Some scholars see benefits to 
blurring boundaries between for-profits and nonprofits,253 but others are 
concerned that current law already drifts far from an understanding of 
charitable efforts as serving society’s neediest.254 
At the same time, there is a long, sporadic history of municipalities 
engaging in tax disputes with nonprofits.255  These disputes often emerge at 
moments of social tension and upheaval.256  Still, municipalities may be loath 
to challenge a local tax-exempt golden goose, especially if they have already 
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negotiated a PILOT with it.257  Because assessments are often local, this can 
result in inequitable enforcement.  Mid-size nonprofits may face strictly 
enforced profit tests that larger nonprofits have been able to ignore.258  
Meanwhile, the latter may face PILOT demands that look increasingly like 
property taxes.  Although this discretion is arguably appropriate in the 
context of municipal competition in tax rates and services,259 as currently 
practiced, nonprofits face an uncertain and incoherent enforcement 
landscape.  Greater alignment between local and federal policy would reduce 
the regulatory compliance burden for nonprofits.260  Reshaping the border 
between for-profits and nonprofits through legislation also offers a chance to 
redesign incentives for creating public goods and benefits.261 
III.  ATTEMPTS AT RECONCILIATION 
This Part examines various attempts to address the dilemmas posed by the 
local burdens and impacts of wealthy nonprofits as well as attempts to 
reconcile the disparities between federal and state laws regulating the sector.  
Part III.A focuses on the Fields litigation as a model for laissez-faire 
enforcement of state-level regulation, while Part III.B examines reforms in a 
number of states that have sought to bring rules governing charitable and 
educational exemptions from ad valorem property taxes closer to the rules 
governing the federal income-tax exemption. 
Most property-tax exemption statutes were drafted well before the 
twentieth-century expansion of academia or the Bayh-Dole Act.  New laws 
at the state level could resolve substantial disconnections between state and 
federal regulation of nonprofits.  Some state legislatures are starting to 
address these issues; the Fields case indicates that they should move more 
rapidly towards thoroughgoing reform. 
A.  The Fields Litigation Is a Fraught Model for Citizen Enforcement 
Fields can be seen as a test of whether local taxpayers can participate in 
oversight of entities with significant power in their communities.  Under the 
current framework, there are barriers to oversight by public actors.  The IRS 
is unlikely to challenge universities for their patent activities given the clear 
intent of the Bayh-Dole Act and its own past practice.262  State attorneys 
general enforce nonprofit corporation laws regarding fiduciary duties of 
 
 257. See, e.g., supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text. 
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boards and protect charitable assets;263 they do not interfere in local tax 
disputes.  Municipalities, meanwhile, have both incentives and disincentives 
to challenge exemptions.264 
If the litigation model used in Fields becomes widespread, it could 
transform the nonprofit landscape.  In a drafted amicus brief to a denied 
appeal during the case, New Jersey’s Center for Non-Profit Corporations, an 
umbrella organization for the state’s thirty-thousand nonprofit entities, 
argued that a loss for the defendants could damage the entire sector.265  While 
expanding this model could give an oversight voice to citizens often excluded 
from municipal power, it could also put nonprofits at risk of repeated suits 
by opportunists and have a chilling effect on nonprofits engaged in 
controversial public services.266  To understand why Fields has the potential 
to change the landscape of nonprofit oversight, it is helpful to understand the 
outcome of the case as well as the broader relationship between Princeton 
University and its surrounding community.  Part III.A.1 sketches the social 
context for this exemption challenge, while Part III.A.2 closely examines the 
standing model that the plaintiffs employed. 
1.  The Social Context for Fields 
The first iteration of the Fields suit began after a controversial municipal 
reassessment in 2010 that was deemed valid by a local commission in 
2011.267  This reassessment significantly increased many property valuations 
and related tax bills.268  When Fields settled in October 2016,269 the number 
of plaintiffs had increased more than sixfold.270  Among these was Shirley 
Satterfield, a prominent local citizen who grew up in Princeton, worked at 
the public high school, and served on the boards of the historical society and 
a group dedicated to fighting local racial prejudice.271  She joined the suit 
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along with roughly two dozen plaintiffs who primarily resided in a 
historically African American neighborhood known as Witherspoon-
Jackson, where she grew up.272  This neighborhood has residents whose 
grandparents and great-grandparents were displaced from a central district, 
now known as Palmer Square, during a redevelopment initiative around 1930 
aimed at improving the prestige of the University.273  That project ejected 
African Americans from the municipal center, which intensified residential 
segregation in Princeton.274  The Witherspoon-Jackson neighborhood was 
particularly affected by the 2010 revaluation.275  Neighborhood residents 
argue that gentrification is pushing them out of this historic community.276  
The commission noted the large proportion of exempt properties and 
recommended the review of exemptions.277 
These pocketbook concerns for affordability and community diversity 
drove the litigation.278  One analysis estimated that in-court victory for the 
plaintiffs could have reduced the average property-tax burden in Princeton 
from about $17,700 per year to roughly $11,800.279  Such concrete financial 
impact is due in part to Princeton University’s significant wealth, which 
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valued its total net assets at over $21 billion.280  Its physical property includes 
about 190 buildings on 500 acres of land.281  That acreage is equivalent to 
roughly 4 percent of the current municipality,282 or roughly 42 percent of the 
former borough, where most of the University’s real property is located.283  
The University engages in its own planning process in developing this 
property independent from the municipality’s planning board.284 
Not all of the University’s property, however, is located within Princeton; 
some of its real estate stretches into two neighboring towns.285  Additionally, 
the University holds interests in mortgages and tenancy-in-common 
agreements offered to qualifying faculty and staff who purchase newly 
acquired homes within nine miles of campus or within the city of Trenton.286  
It also has repurchase rights to 160 homes in two Princeton neighborhoods.287  
The University employs over 13,000 people, many of whom live in the 
surrounding area.288  It has an immense impact on its local economy and 
effectively controls much of the real property that surrounds it and on which 
it is located. 
In terms of its wealth and economic impact on its local community, 
Princeton University may be an extreme example.  Yet it is not alone.  The 
nonprofit sector is large;289 its revenues grew almost twice as fast as the rest 
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U., http://campusplan.princeton.edu/2026plan [https://perma.cc/GQX3-658L] (last visited 
Feb. 14, 2018). 
 285. See Daniel Day, Office of Commc’ns, University Gives Town Residents, Officials 
Update on Development of 2026 Campus Plan, PRINCETON U. (Sept. 20, 2016, 1:15 PM), 
http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S47/43/87O32/ [https://perma.cc/DTF6-
8BXH]. 
 286. See Standard Mortgage Program, PRINCETON U, https://hres.princeton.edu/faculty-
staff/home-ownership-programs/standard-mortgage-program [https://perma.cc/3MPW-
4L4Y] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018); Tenancy-in-Common Program, PRINCETON U., 
https://hres.princeton.edu/faculty-staff/home-ownership-programs/tenancy-in-common-
program [https://perma.cc/NW3A-86ZF] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 287. See Princeton Faculty Residential Purchase Plan, PRINCETON U. 
https://hres.princeton.edu/faculty-staff/home-ownership-programs/princeton-faculty-
residential-purchase-plan [https://perma.cc/5VN4-MER3] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 288. Princeton University’s Form 990 filing for the fiscal year ending June 2014 lists 
13,869 employees and 15,000 volunteers. See Trs. of Princeton Univ., supra note 280, at 1. 
 289. See DAPHNE A. KENYON & ADAM H. LANGLEY, LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, THE 
PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION FOR NONPROFITS AND REVENUE IMPLICATIONS FOR CITIES 2 (2011), 
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of the economy from 1995 to 2010.290  Nonprofit organizations hold 
substantial assets, transact complex business, and are key players in local 
economies.291  Many municipalities have large nonprofit sectors that occupy 
significant proportions of locally assessable land.292 
2.  The Standing Model Used in Fields 
Fields tests whether individual citizens can separately oversee laws 
governing nonprofit entities.  Importantly, the plaintiffs had not simply 
claimed that certain research facilities should be added to the tax roll.  
Instead, they argued that the entire institution was sufficiently profit seeking 
so that all of its properties would no longer merit exemption.293  The plaintiffs 
were thus asserting a large role in enforcing substantive requirements for 
property-tax exemption in New Jersey.  A key moment in the case was Judge 
Bianco’s decision on the burden of proof and standing; he affirmed the 
plaintiffs’ right to bring a third-party challenge and confirmed that they 
would not bear the burden of proof at trial.294 
New Jersey has allowed third-party tax-exemption suits since at least 
1941.295  In that year, a former volunteer fireman, suing pro se, challenged 
the status of the firehouse where he had volunteered.296  Profit was not at 
issue as it was not wholly excluded in the statutory exemption for 
firehouses.297  The specific point in that case is now moot,298 but the court’s 
holding on the plaintiff’s right to sue remains valid. 
In another case from the civil rights era, citizens tried to challenge 
property-tax exemptions and liquor licenses of all Elks Lodges in New 
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 291. See, e.g., Economic Impact, NAT’L COUNCIL NONPROFITS, 
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visited Feb. 14, 2018). 
 292. See Brody, supra note 255, at x (noting that this is particularly true in the Northeast). 
 293. See 2015 Complaint, supra note 210, at 2–11. 
 294. See Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 28 N.J. Tax 574, 587 n.11 (2015). 
 295. See Post v. Warren Point Volunteer Firemen’s Ass’n, 19 A.2d 636, 636 (N.J. B.T.A. 
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 296. See Post, 19 A.2d at 636; ELAINE B. WINSHELL & JANE LYLE DIEPEVEEN, FAIR LAWN 
27 (2001) (reproducing a photograph showing Peter Post among volunteer firemen). 
 297. See Post, 19 A.2d at 636.  The current version of this exemption continues to allow 
for a limited form of profit making. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.10. 
 298. It now follows an actual-use standard rather than an exclusive-use standard. See N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 54:4-3.10; see also supra notes 73–78 and accompanying text. 
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state’s beneficial treatment of the organizations violated the state and federal 
constitutions.  When that case was decided, it had been narrowed to the 
county of the plaintiffs’ residence in accordance with New Jersey’s taxpayer 
standing law, but the plaintiffs won on the merits.300  These cases 
demonstrate that New Jersey law currently provides county-level standing 
for third-party exemption challenges.301 
Although many states lack laws that so clearly allow such cases, municipal 
taxpayers in other jurisdictions may be able to bring similar third-party 
exemption challenges.  Municipal taxpayers have standing to bring 
constitutional challenges to local levies.302  Whether this standing can be 
extended to third-party statutory challenges remains to be determined based 
on specific legal frameworks in other states.303  Some states, like New Jersey, 
incorporate taxpayer standing by statute,304 while in others permissive rules 
are judge made.305  Some states only allow such suits if they are particularly 
important.306  Both Ohio and Pennsylvania allow for some taxpayer standing 
if the underlying issues are of great significance.307 
The Minnesota Supreme Court allows even broader taxpayer standing not 
only for constitutional claims but also statutory ones.  It has held that “a state 
or local taxpayer has sufficient interest to challenge illegal expenditures.”308  
Although legislative grants of exemption are fiscally equivalent to 
expenditures,309 it is possible that states that do permit taxpayer standing may 
not extend it to third-party exemption challenges. 
The rationale for municipal taxpayer standing in federal courts when 
asserting constitutional injuries is that the pocketbook injury to the municipal 
taxpayer is palpable and particular, transcending a mere general interest in 
the vindication of the law.310  Yet as critics have pointed out, this grants about 
8.5 million citizens of New York City more ability to contest a tax than about 
 
 300. See id. at 91. 
 301. For another discussion of this standing model in New Jersey, see David B. Wolfe, 
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Property Tax Appeals, N.J. LAW., Apr. 2017, at 38. 
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 305. See id. at 36. 
 306. See id. at 37–39 (discussing standards in Arizona, Alaska, Iowa, and South Carolina 
with public importance thresholds). 
 307. See id. at 39. 
 308. McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566, 570 (Minn. 1977).  Such potential state-level 
claims are not abrogated by Bayh-Dole. See infra Part II.A. 
 309. See Linda Sugin, Invisible Taxpayers, 69 TAX L. REV. 617, 620, 629, 644 (2016). 
 310. See Staudt, supra note 302, at 826, 831–32; cf. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652, 2663 (2013) (denying federal standing to “concerned bystanders . . . vindicat[ing] . . . 
value interests” (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986))). 
2018] NONPROFIT COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY 2065 
1.9 million citizens of Nebraska.311  Because the federal standing bars are 
generally higher than those in state courts, the existence of federal standing 
for municipal taxpayers’ constitutional claims suggests that, where state law 
provides no explicit bar, local statutory challenges asserting pocketbook 
injuries may be legally cognizable—even as third-party exemption 
challenges. 
If other citizens take Fields as a model, they could enforce laws intended 
to bind nonprofits, even where public actors are unwilling to do so.  To 
succeed in any challenge, such municipal taxpayers need meritorious claims 
that the exemptions are undeserved.  In Fields, the main claim was that 
Princeton University’s Bayh-Dole activities ran afoul of New Jersey’s limits 
on how exempt properties may be used to produce profit.312  The model may 
lend itself particularly well to plaintiffs, like the Witherspoon-Jackson 
residents, who may share in fewer of the local benefits that an elite institution 
provides.313  Because most jurisdictions view exemptions skeptically—
placing burdens of proof on claimants314—litigation modeled after Fields 
would force nonprofits to reprove their exemption claims at trial, as in 
Fields.315 
This balance of power creates strong incentives for settlement.  Yet 
without a decision on the merits, a challenged organization would not be 
protected against the next set of aggrieved taxpayers.316  Nonprofits fear 
these dynamics will undermine their financial stability.317  Although few 
plaintiffs have made use of this standing model, nonprofits worry it will 
become a tool of harassment in the future.318  Proposed legislation in New 
Jersey, however, would eliminate this standing.319 
B.  Legislative Reforms Offer the Best Solutions 
Because of current disincentives to oversight, the model of litigation 
pioneered in Fields could offer a unique opportunity for citizens to enforce 
existing laws governing the nonprofit sector.  Underlying problems, however, 
often result from conflicting frameworks, rather than just a lack of oversight.  
Therefore, such suits do not represent the best means for drawing lines on 
nonprofits’ revenue-generating activities.  Although the current framework 
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http://www.neded.org/files/research/stathand/bsect1.htm [https://perma.cc/PBR2-EUQW]. 
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accompanying text. 
 315. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
 316. See, e.g., In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co./Celotex Asbestos Tr., 67 A.3d 587, 
596 (N.J. 2013) (upholding New Jersey’s collateral estoppel standard, which bars only claims 
fully litigated against a prior party or one in privity where no unfairness to plaintiffs results). 
 317. See Motion for Leave to Appear as Amici Curiae of Center for Non-Profit 
Corporations, Inc. et al., at 5–7, Fields v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., No. AM185-15 (N.J. Super. 
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 319. See infra Part III.B.1. 
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lacks incentives to equitable enforcement, expanding this model of litigation 
could have significant negative implications for nonprofits.  This Note argues 
that enforcing the current boundaries of nonprofit law via citizen lawsuits 
would have a less beneficial effect on the sector than thoroughgoing reforms 
of those boundaries at the state level.  Such reform should focus on better 
aligning state and federal law or formalizing PILOTs rather than enacting 
procedural barriers to eliminate suits like Fields without addressing 
substantive weaknesses in current law. 
Part III.B.1 examines the initial statutory response to Fields in New Jersey, 
while Part III.B.2 surveys how Connecticut law has approached its large 
nonprofit sector.  This Note continues its search for workable statutory 
schemes in Part III.B.3, which examines proposed legislation in 
Massachusetts, and in Part III.B.4, which argues that proposed legislation in 
Michigan in 2015 was overly deferential to federal law.  Finally, Part III.B.5 
concludes that California’s nuanced approach provides a better balance of 
interests. 
1.  Legislative Responses in New Jersey 
Recently proposed legislation in New Jersey ignores the key challenge by 
sidestepping the tension between state law and the federal policy favoring 
research revenues.  After Princeton University faced setbacks during motion 
practice, a veteran state assemblyman, who had formerly represented the 
Borough of Princeton, proposed legislation to prevent all third-party 
property-tax challenges.320  His bill was amended shortly before the 
settlement to further limit tax-exemption challenges where a PILOT is in 
place.321  A state senator incorporated his proposal in a matching bill at the 
end of February 2017.322  The bill was passed by the New Jersey State Senate 
but not scheduled for a vote in the Assembly before the session expired.323  
As this Note discusses, this type of procedural reform is not an ideal solution 
to the substantive problems presented by this case.  Legislation in other states 
offers better models for reform. 
 
 320. See Gen. Assemb. 3888, 217th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (as introduced by N.J. Assembly, 
June 6, 2016). 
 321. See Gen. Assemb. 3888, 217th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (as amended and substituted by 
N.J. Assembly, Sept. 19, 2016). 
 322. See S. 2212, 217th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (as amended and substituted by N.J. Senate, 
Feb. 27, 2017).  The original version contains a statement of the proposed effect. See S. 2212, 
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taxpayers from filing property tax appeals with respect to the property of others” and noting 
that “under current law, property taxpayers may challenge the assessment or exempt status of 
their own property as well as that of any other property in their county”). 
 323. See NJ A3888, LEGISCAN, https://legiscan.com/NJ/bill/A3888/2016  
[https://perma.cc/46G2-QTE6] (last visited Feb. 14, 2018); NJ S2212, LEGISCAN, 
https://legiscan.com/NJ/bill/S2212/2016 [https://perma.cc/4EQV-VBPZ] (last visited Feb. 14, 
2018). 
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2.  The Connecticut Model 
Connecticut has long been a leader in designing innovative reforms to 
regulate nonprofits.  Its stated-funded PILOT system, introduced in the 
1970s,324 is a better way to balance the statewide interest in flourishing 
nonprofits with local impacts on services.  Outside Connecticut, exempt 
institutions often make PILOTs directly to municipalities on a 
pseudovoluntary basis.325  By having the state disburse PILOT payments to 
municipalities, the burden of such institutions is spread among a wider 
constituency that chooses democratically to support them.  Connecticut and 
the world may benefit more from Yale than the citizens of New Haven; the 
Connecticut model accommodates for this. 
Yet even in Connecticut, tensions over nonprofit property tax exemptions 
remain.  In 2015, the Connecticut House of Representatives passed a bill to 
deny new exemptions to properties acquired by colleges and hospitals beyond 
their “main campuses.”326  A bill in the state senate would have increased 
state funding for PILOT reimbursements to municipalities.327  Though 
neither was adopted, both demonstrated not only a legislative will to address 
the strain large nonprofits put on municipalities but also that the Connecticut 
model itself is stressed by the expansion of wealth within the sector. 
3.  Standardization of PILOTs in Massachusetts 
Legislation to reform PILOTs has been regularly introduced and rejected 
in Massachusetts since 2012.328  The most recent bill would permit any 
municipality or taxing district to convert ad hoc PILOTs into regularized 
required payments at 25 percent of the full tax rate otherwise applicable, 
further discounted for a nonprofit’s local services.329  While critics argue that 
this is only a lower level of tax for nonprofits, giving municipalities 
permission to tax nonprofits at a discount could balance social goals by 
acknowledging needs of municipalities as well as the benefits that nonprofits 
create.  Implementing something similar in most states, however, could 
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require constitutional amendments or significant statutory reform to allow 
not only for the tax itself but also for the inequality in the rate scheme.330 
4.  Greater Alignment in Michigan? 
In Michigan, legislation was introduced in 2016 to align property-tax 
exemptions more directly with federal exemptions after nonprofits across the 
state received unexpected tax bills.331  The tabled bill would have considered 
a § 501(c)(3) status to be proof that an organization is charitable; property 
use consistent with federally exempt purposes would be exempt.  This change 
would have removed an exclusive-use test in Michigan law and given 
nonprofits assurance that complying with federal standards would protect 
them at the state level.332  Thus, this proposed system would have essentially 
deferred questions regarding qualification for state exemptions to compliance 
with federal law.  But where the federal law uses UBIT to tax revenues that 
cross over into the zone of commerciality, the Michigan proposal did not 
provide a means for municipalities to receive partial payments for complex 
property uses.  After being tabled in the session ending 2016, this Michigan 
proposal has not yet been reintroduced.333 
5.  California’s Sophisticated Formula 
California has long had one of the better solutions to the problem of the 
complex nature of nonprofit business.334  In 1988, the state legislature 
incorporated the federal UBIT system in its assessment.335  Where a UBIT 
fragmentation does not map onto a physical piece of property, the law applies 
a specific formula for factoring the income proportion of UBIT into the 
valuation and tax assessment.336  This schema encompasses academic 
properties337 as well as ones with exemptions for “religious, hospital, 
scientific, or charitable purposes.”338  It creates certainty and better aligns 
with federal policy.  Importantly, it employs a mechanism for assessment 
when a nonexempt use is neither the primary use of the property nor isolated 
in a specific portion of it. 
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 335. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 214.05(a). 
 336. See id. § 214.05(b)(3). 
 337. See id. § 214(b)–(c), (e). 
 338. Id. § 214(a). 
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In many states, UBIT is only integrated in corporate income-tax 
exemptions,339 not ones for property tax.  Yet as this Note argues, as long as 
ad valorem property taxes provide the main source of revenues for 
municipalities, property-tax exemptions for complex nonprofit businesses 
will remain controversial.  Because property ownership is a key factor in 
producing revenues, untaxed commercial uses of property will continue to 
require justification.  Most existing partial taxation laws allow for flexibility 
with leases and nonexempt activities but are still too tied to ideas of 
physically separable space.  California’s system is more nuanced, while its 
reference to the federal UBIT rules allows for relatively simple compliance. 
IV.  A RESOLUTION? 
The next round of state law reform regarding nonprofits or property taxes 
should tackle these discrepancies directly by leaning on both the California 
and Connecticut statutory regimes as well as aspects of the proposed 
legislation in Massachusetts. 
Legislative reforms that give nonprofits certainty are preferable to 
piecemeal litigation.340  Good reform would clarify the law, better align with 
federal policy, and give consistency to PILOTs now made on an ad hoc basis.  
States with profit tests should either make explicit that Bayh-Dole activities 
will not void property-tax exemptions or indicate precisely how such 
activities will be assessed. 
State property-tax laws should face up to the contemporary business 
practices of universities, hospitals, and other large nonprofits.  Compensation 
to local communities for the distorting effects of large tax-exempt institutions 
on local revenues and costs should be more coherent.  Using a state-mediated 
mechanism, as in the Connecticut model, would add an important level of 
fairness to any PILOT regime.  Yet, as discussed above, this alone is 
insufficient.  Instead, payments from nonprofits should be tied to a new 
formula that uses UBIT or other clear guidelines to assess truly nonexempt 
property uses, as in the California model, possibly with discounts for local 
benefits provided, as in the Massachusetts proposal.  Just as states have begun 
requiring that hospitals provide community benefits,341 similar standards for 
academic institutions could clarify local service expectations now negotiated 
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ad hoc.342  Constitutional limits on state laws would provide further 
assurances of consistency and fairness.343 
An ideal reform might combine all of these mechanisms.  Thus, a hospital 
or university would pay ad valorem taxes for identifiable fractions of parcels 
used for nonexempt purposes by applying a set fraction derived from the 
institution’s UBIT or via a clearly defined calculation of non-exempt 
revenues.  Additionally, it would be eligible for credits or deductions for 
qualifying provision of state or local benefits.  These taxes would be collected 
at the state level and remitted to municipalities.  Such reforms may not satisfy 
the harshest critics of elite universities, but they would better balance 
complex social needs. 
Whether or not states adopt comprehensive reform measures, a repeal of 
Bayh-Dole is unlikely.  Thus, states with profit tests should at least resolve 
how a nonprofit engaged in patenting can maintain a property-tax exemption. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the case settled, Fields challenges the current status quo and 
reveals its shortcomings.  Questions about how to best favor the public’s 
interest in a thriving and independent charitable sector have provoked 
controversy for decades.  Still, state laws have failed to adequately 
understand, accommodate, foster, and regulate the changing nature of 
universities and other nonprofits.  The most reasoned response would be to 
see these issues as policy choices better submitted to legislatures than judges. 
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